[2003] Psyops employed to sap Iraqi spirit
If the first Gulf War is remembered for introducing the world to smart bombs and CNN, the second one — at least judging by its first two days — may well become known as the “psyops” war.
Even as massive airstrikes pummeled downtown Baghdad Friday, formally ushering in what the Pentagon termed its “shock and awe” campaign, many analysts argued that the enduring legacy of this war may not be the use of bombs but the implementation of psychological warfare – or psyops – to quickly convince both Saddam Hussein’s lieutenants and his army that resistance was futile.
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“This is kinetic psyops,” said Gen. Michael Short, who commanded the air campaign during Kosovo campaign. “It’s all designed to break Saddam’s will.”
Rumors of Saddam’s death and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz’s defection, leaks about high-level surrender talks with Republican Guard units, 17 million leaflets dumped over Iraqi lines that warned Iraqi soldiers of certain death if they fight all fed into a broad psychological warfare campaign.
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U.S. officials have carefully cultivated this confusion, understandably reluctant to knock down any rumor that might sow confusion inside Saddam’s inner circle, and thus advance the aim of regime change.
“I think that the rumor mill, like the overt coverage the military is letting out, is very much being used to put the Iraqi regime on edge,” says William Arkin, an NBC News analyst and authority on information warfare. “Just look at what the Iraqi News Agency and Iraqi officials are saying. It is extraordinary that they confirmed that one of Saddam’s homes was hit in the air raid, and that his wife and daughters were safe. When’s the last time you remember the Iraqi News Agency even mentioning that Saddam has a wife and three daughters?”
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Beyond the highly visible efforts to shatter the confidence of the Iraqi military and leadership, a more secretive and deliberate effort is underway to marry psyops with action on the ground. These operations, officials said, are carefully planned and calibrated to shock, if not awe, Iraqi forces into realizing their defensive efforts are futile.
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A typical mission might involve U.S. warplanes targeting a business or facility that — while of little military value — is of high emotional value to Saddam or his family. Another variation might include covert operations to snatch relatives, to destroy a getaway aircraft, or to heist large caches of Saddam’s wealth.
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Further, psyops units carry none of the glamour associated with elite SEAL and Green Beret units. Indeed, if anything, psyops is associated in the public mind with the largely unsuccessful effort to “win hearts and minds” in Vietnam.
This began to change during the 1999 Kosovo war. There, U.S. psyops warriors ran a series of feints and harassment missions designed to shake the resolve of the Serbian regime of Slobodan Milosevic.
As most U.S. and NATO air units concentrated on hitting military targets throughout Serbia and its Kosovo province, a select few missions targeted “leadership” facilities to drive home the point that the Milosevic family — and the corrupt family business — would not be spared.
Still, the mission did not, in the end, undermine the Milosevic regime. Leaflets designed to convince Serb units to surrender turned out to be laughably translated, and by the end of the war, Gen. Wesley Clark, the campaign’s overall commander, dismissed them as “a joke.”
No one is laughing now. Saddam may still hold his ground, and the Republican Guard may still choose to fight. But it is clear that the psyops campaign is woven into the very fabric of this war.
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