This didn’t age well.

A review of RAND Corporation’s ‘War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable’

RAND presents four conflict scenarios over two different time periods: low-intensity and high-intensity, short and long duration, and occurring either in 2015 or 2025. The low-intensity conflicts are fairly straightforward; however, RAND’s high-intensity 2025 scenario draws a number of contestable conclusions, namely that:

• Escalation to the nuclear level in any US-China conflict, however intense, is very unlikely;
• War would be far more devastating for China, with an estimated 25%-35%  reduction in GDP after one year, as opposed to a 5%-10% reduction for the US;
• A long conflict would test the internal stability of the Chinese state; and
• The prospect of major land operations is low, unless the war was on the Korean peninsula.

RAND’s ultimate conclusion is summed up by this quote: ‘China could not win, and might lose, a severe war with the United States in 2025.’

The authors note that Chinese policymakers are one of their intended audiences. This aims to ensure that miscalculation owing to overconfidence in China’s military capacity is avoided. Unfortunately, in attempting to enhance the deterrent effect of America’s Pacific forces, RAND makes a number of assertions that paint an overly rosy picture for the US. It must be stressed that these criticisms can only be made due to RAND’s willingness tackle this important subject. 

1. RAND seriously underestimates the probability of a high-intensity conflict escalating to the nuclear level

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2. RAND’s assessment of US economic resilience is unrealistic

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First, in addition to the cessation of bilateral trade with China, US trade would be adversely affected with every other country whose own economy is dependent on Chinese trade. Moreover, it is not only the raw value of bilateral trade, but the total value of American goods for which Chinese manufacturing is an indispensable component. This would hardly be made up domestically, as any resurgence in domestic manufacturing in the long term would likely to be directly supporting America’s war effort

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3. Disruption of China’s internal stability is wishful thinking

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4. RAND’s conclusion about the use of land forces is incorrect

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The correct military decision for China would be to place enough pressure on the South to force America to commit large scale forces to the defence, without overwhelming it immediately and presenting the US with a fait accompli. Once committed, the US would be in a diabolical military situation. Hundreds of thousands of US land forces would be engaged against an enormous number of enemy combatants, supported by vulnerable supply lines in highly contested waters near the Chinese mainland. Indeed, it is perfectly likely a war that started in the Spratlys could be lost by the US at Busan. 

RAND: ‘War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable

Lowy Institute, is funded by the Australian government, etc.

How RAND is funded