The United States has also recently transitioned from an ambiguous approach [strategic ambiguity] to deterring a Chinese invasion on Taiwan to one that more clearly states that the United States will defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion (referred to as strategic clarity).
P93: Understanding and Countering China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations | RAND
This is not true! The Biden administration “walked back” his statements each time!
12-24-2024, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft: Trump’s China dilemma
As such threats became more frequent and menacing, leaders in Washington continued to debate the validity of “strategic ambiguity,” with some insisting it should be replaced by a policy of “strategic clarity” involving an ironclad commitment to assist Taiwan should it be invaded by China. President Biden seemed to embrace this view, repeatedly affirming that the U.S. was obligated to defend Taiwan under such circumstances. However, each time he said so, his aides walked back his words, insisting the U.S. was under no legal obligation to do so.
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Many of Trump’s closest advisers have, in fact, insisted on “strategic clarity” and increased military cooperation with Taiwan. Michael Waltz, for example, has asserted that the U.S. must “be clear we’ll defend Taiwan as a deterrent measure.” He has also called for an increased military presence in the Western Pacific. Similarly, last June, Robert C. O’Brien, Trump’s national security adviser from 2019 to 2021, wrote that the U.S. “should make clear” its “commitment” to “help defend” Taiwan, while expanding military cooperation with the island.
Trump himself has made no such commitments, suggesting instead a more ambivalent stance. In his typical fashion, in fact, he’s called on Taiwan to spend more on its own defense and expressed anger at the concentration of advanced chip-making on the island, claiming that the Taiwanese “did take about 100% of our chip business.” But he’s also warned of harsh economic measures were China to impose a blockade of the island, telling the editorial board of the Wall Street Journal, “I would say [to President Xi]: if you go into Taiwan, I’m sorry to do this, I’m going to tax you at 150% to 200%.” He wouldn’t need to threaten the use of force to prevent a blockade, he added, because President Xi “respects me and he knows I’m [expletive] crazy.”
The United States has NO treaty obligation to defend Taiwan!
09-25-2024, Council of Foreign Relations: U.S. Military Support for Taiwan in Five Charts
The United States describes Taiwan as a “key partner in the Indo-Pacific.” It does not have a treaty obligation to defend Taiwan and has not clarified as a matter of policy whether it would come to Taiwan’s direct defense if the island were attacked by China, although President Joe Biden has said on four occasions that he would. Washington maintains an intentionally vague policy in this regard—known as “strategic ambiguity”—in contrast to its explicit defense commitments to U.S. treaty allies in the region, namely Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand. Without direct U.S. military intervention, most security analysts say China would be able to conquer Taiwan by force, albeit at a potentially considerable cost.
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What shapes the defense relationship today?
In response to the historic reversal in policy, initiated by the Richard Nixon administration and executed by the Jimmy Carter administration, the U.S. Congress passed the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) to establish and codify the informal relationship. The TRA legally commits the United States to providing Taiwan with military support to maintain its self-defense capabilities. It also says the U.S. government will “consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means…of grave concern to the United States.” However, it does not commit the United States to come to Taiwan’s defense if the island is attacked.
08-15-2024, Congressional Research Service – Taiwan: Defense and Military Issues
U.S. Support for Taiwan’s Defense
The United States has maintained unofficial defense ties with Taiwan since 1980, when President Carter terminated a 1954 U.S.-ROC mutual defense treaty. (The United States terminated diplomatic relations with Taiwan and withdrew its military personnel in 1979.) The robust defense relationship includes arms transfers; routine bilateral defense dialogues and planning; and training activities in both the United States and Taiwan, including, since 2023, using International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds. U.S.-Taiwan defense relations have substantially contributed to Taiwan’s military capabilities.
U.S. Strategy and Policy
The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA, P.L. 96-8; 22 U.S.C.§§3301 et seq.), enacted immediately following the termination of official relations, includes multiple security-related provisions. Among other things, the TRA states that it is U.S. policy to “make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability” and “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.”
The TRA does not require the United States to defend Taiwan, but by stating it is U.S. policy to maintain the capacity to do so, the TRA creates “strategic ambiguity” about potential U.S. actions in the event of a PRC attack. Some observers advocate making a formal commitment to defend Taiwan. Supporters of a shift to “strategic clarity” argue such clarity is necessary to deter an increasingly capable and assertive PRC. Supporters of strategic ambiguity argue the long-standing policy encourages restraint by both Beijing and Taipei and incentivizes Taipei to invest more in its own defense.
05-10-2024, Why Should We Care About America’s Indo-Pacific Allies?
We’re not obligated to defend Taiwan. What we are obligated to do is governed by the law and the law is the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act.
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But defending Taiwan is not one of those things, but it means that we sell them equipment that they need to defend themselves and the like. And it makes it clear intent that we want a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan PRC issue, a peaceful resolution across the Taiwan Strait. And that we are opposed to a forceful reunification against the Taiwanese people’s will.
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Is the United States going to defend Taiwan? If the answer to that question is yes, they’re going to lose hundreds of thousands of troops in that fight and they ought to know that. And then they can then make the calculus whether it’s worth it or not.
— Admiral Harry B. Harris, Jr., former commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
Text: “The Taiwan Relations Act does not commit the United States to come to the defense of Taiwan in the event of an attack,” Senator John Kerry (Democrat of Massachusetts) said in an April 25 speech to the Senate.
Kerry, the highest-ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, was responding to a television interview President Bush gave earlier that day in which the president reportedly said the United States has an obligation to defend Taiwan if it were attacked.
President Bush made “a far-reaching comment this morning on the American defense of Taiwan, a comment which suggests that without any consultation with Congress, without any prior notice to the Congress, a policy that has been in place for 30 years is now summarily being changed with implications that I believe are serious,” he said.
For nearly 30 years, Kerry said, U.S. policy has been “there is but one China; Taiwan is a part of China, and the question of Taiwan’s future must be settled peacefully.”
The United States has never stated what it would do “if Beijing attempted to use force to reunify Taiwan with the mainland — until today,” he said.
The United States has been deliberately vague about the circumstances under which it would come to Taiwan’s defense, and that strategic ambiguity should be maintained, Kerry said.
Removing strategic ambiguity “runs the risk of decreasing Taiwan’s security rather than increasing it and of eliminating the flexibility that we will need to determine how to respond in any given situation,” he continued.
Kerry said that the Taiwan Relations Act “commits us to provide Taiwan with the necessary military equipment to meet its legitimate self-defense needs.”
I have one more post to make for part three. The reason why I’m dividing it up is that my notes are too long for this specific topic.
Previously:
Part 1: The marriage of RAND and SeaLight
Part 2: More notes on the marriage of RAND and SeaLight
RAND and SeaLight Part 3b: Four Ways China Is Growing Its Media Influence in Southeast Asia
RAND and SeaLight document (work in progress)
Ms. Cat’s Chronicles 