Pro-Gun Activists Lie About Chinese Gun Ownership

Now while investigating Chinese gun laws I came across this paper written by Huan Zhu at the University of Kansas. This is what she had dug up form her research:

“After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, there have been three special laws or regulations issued on control of firearms, which are Temporary Measures of Control of Firearms (1952), Measures of the People’s Republic of China for the Control of Firearms (1981), and Law of the People’s Republic of China on Gun Control (1996) (hereinafter referred to as Law on Gun Control).”

– Gun Control Policy in United States and China, Huan Zhu

DeepSeek – Temporary Measures of Control of Firearms (1952):

The Temporary Measures of Control of Firearms (1952) were a set of regulations implemented in China during the early years of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). These measures were introduced to address the widespread possession of firearms and other weapons in the aftermath of the Chinese Civil War (1945–1949) and to consolidate the new government’s control over public security.

Key aspects of the Temporary Measures of Control of Firearms (1952) included:

1. Registration and Confiscation: Citizens were required to register any firearms they possessed with the authorities. Unregistered firearms were subject to confiscation.
2. Restrictions on Ownership: The measures strictly limited the types of firearms that civilians could own. Only certain individuals, such as government officials, military personnel, and those with special permits, were allowed to possess firearms.
3. Prohibition of Illegal Possession: The measures criminalized the illegal possession, manufacture, and sale of firearms. Violators faced severe penalties, including imprisonment.
4. Centralized Control: The regulations aimed to centralize control over firearms in the hands of the state, reducing the risk of armed resistance or rebellion against the new government.
5. Public Safety: The measures were part of broader efforts to restore public order and safety in a country that had experienced decades of war and instability.

These temporary measures laid the groundwork for more comprehensive firearms control laws in China, which remain among the strictest in the world today. The PRC government has maintained a firm stance on limiting civilian access to firearms, emphasizing public safety and state control.

DeepSeek – Measures of the People’s Republic of China for the Control of Firearms (1981):

The Measures of the People’s Republic of China for the Control of Firearms (1981) was an early regulation aimed at controlling the possession and use of firearms in China. It was introduced to address public safety concerns and regulate the distribution of firearms, which were more widely available at the time. Key measures included:

1. Licensing System: Individuals and organizations were required to obtain permits to possess firearms.
2. Restricted Ownership: Firearms were generally limited to specific groups, such as law enforcement, military personnel, and certain professionals (e.g., security guards).
3. Prohibition of Unauthorized Use: Unauthorized possession, manufacture, or sale of firearms was strictly prohibited.
4. Confiscation of Illegal Firearms: The government had the authority to confiscate firearms held without proper authorization.

While these measures were a step toward stricter gun control, they were not as comprehensive or stringent as the 1996 Law on the Control of Firearms, which effectively banned private gun ownership for most civilians. The 1981 measures laid the groundwork for the more rigorous policies that followed.

DeepSeek – Law of the People’s Republic of China on Gun Control (1996):

China implemented strict gun control measures with the passage of the Law on the Control of Firearms on October 1, 1996. This law effectively outlawed private ownership of firearms for most civilians, with exceptions for certain groups like law enforcement, military personnel, and specific professionals who require firearms for their duties. The law was part of a broader effort to reduce gun-related violence and maintain public safety. Since then, China has maintained some of the strictest gun control policies in the world.

“Pro-Gun Activists Lie About Chinese Gun Ownership” continued:

So what are the facts surrounding Revolutionary China and gun ownership? Well this is what we do know for a fact. The Communist Party after the Long March resettled in the countryside where they began work with the peasants arming them against the government. Mao and the Communist Party armed the people against the country. As the Japanese were attacking China, the Nationalist (and I stress capitalist) Party was only interested in suppressing the peasants, not the Japanese invaders. Mao organized the defence against the invading foreign army while the capitalists were only interested in killing the people of the nation. Eventually the Nationalist party leader Chang Kai-shek realized the Japanese were destroying the country. The communists gave people guns in order to defend themselves and attack those doing harm to them.

The following were my questions to DeepSeek and its responses:

Is this statement true, “the Communist Party after the Long March resettled in the countryside where they began work with the peasants arming them against the government. Mao and the Communist Party armed the people against the country?”

Yes, after the Long March (1934–1935), the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) resettled in rural areas, particularly in Yan’an in Shaanxi Province, where they began working closely with the peasant population. This period marked a significant shift in the CCP’s strategy, as they focused on mobilizing and organizing peasants to support their revolutionary goals.

Key aspects of this strategy included:

1. Land Reform: The CCP implemented policies to redistribute land from wealthy landlords to poor peasants, which helped gain the support of the rural population.
2. Armed Peasant Militias: The CCP encouraged and organized peasants into militias, arming them to resist the Nationalist government (Kuomintang, or KMT) and later to fight against Japanese forces during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945).
3. Grassroots Mobilization: The CCP worked to build strong ties with the peasantry by addressing their grievances and involving them in the revolutionary struggle.

This approach of arming and mobilizing peasants was a key factor in the CCP’s ability to build a strong base of support in the countryside, which ultimately contributed to their victory in the Chinese Civil War (1945–1949) and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949.

Is this statement true, “as the Japanese were attacking China, the Nationalist (and I stress capitalist) Party was only interested in suppressing the peasants, not the Japanese invaders?”

The statement “As the Japanese were attacking China, the Nationalist (and I stress capitalist) Party was only interested in suppressing the peasants, not the Japanese invaders” is an oversimplification and not entirely accurate. While the Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang (KMT), led by Chiang Kai-shek, did prioritize suppressing the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and peasant uprisings during certain periods, it is incorrect to say they were only interested in this and not in resisting the Japanese invaders.

Here’s a more nuanced perspective:

1. Resistance to Japanese Invasion: The KMT did fight against the Japanese during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945). Major battles, such as the Battle of Shanghai (1937) and the Battle of Wuhan (1938), involved significant KMT forces and demonstrated their commitment to resisting Japanese aggression. The KMT also received international support, including from the United States and the Soviet Union, to fight the Japanese.
2. Internal Conflicts: At the same time, the KMT was engaged in a long-standing conflict with the CCP, which had established strongholds in rural areas and mobilized peasants against the KMT. Chiang Kai-shek viewed the CCP as a greater threat to his regime than the Japanese, leading to periods where the KMT focused more on suppressing the CCP and peasant revolts than fighting the Japanese. This was particularly evident during the New Fourth Army Incident (1941), where KMT forces attacked CCP troops instead of focusing on the Japanese.
3. Complex Priorities: The KMT’s strategy was shaped by the need to balance external threats (Japan) and internal threats (CCP and peasant uprisings). While they did fight the Japanese, their prioritization of internal suppression often weakened their overall war effort and alienated many peasants, who increasingly supported the CCP.

In summary, while the KMT did resist the Japanese, their focus on suppressing the CCP and peasant movements often overshadowed their efforts against Japan, contributing to their eventual loss of support among the Chinese population. The statement oversimplifies a complex historical reality.