Note: The 3rd Assault Brigade is widely regarded as the successor to the Azov Battalion, a unit originally founded by Neo-Nazi Andriy Biletsky. The battalion, later expanded and reorganized into the Azov Regiment, underwent rebranding amid evolving military and political dynamics, eventually forming the core of the current brigade.

El Tercer Cuerpo de Andriy Biletsky (Andriy Biletsky’s Third Corps)

On March 14, Colonel Andriy Biletsky, commander of the Third Assault Brigade, announced its conversion into the Third Corps of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, a formation that will remain under his command. In a video sharing the news on Instagram, Biletsky stated:

Over three years, we have gained unique experience in fierce battles, carried out successful counterattacks, and become the most effective in the use of drones on the front lines. We have implemented technologies, changed the approach to personnel training, and created the best recruitment system in the country. We have launched our own FPV and NRC* schools. We have created large-scale cultural and educational projects. It’s time to expand our horizons…Our plans are to change the principles of this war. And, therefore, to turn the tide of the war in Ukraine’s favor.

With this announcement, the core of the Azov movement’s military organization is consolidated as a central force within the Ukrainian military structures. Military corps typically include four to six brigades, in addition to the necessary support units (engineering, combat logistics support, reconnaissance, anti-aircraft artillery, etc.) and a separate command structure that enables fully autonomous operational action. The political-military movement represented by Biletsky could thus have its own small, autonomous army within the broader Ukrainian military structure.

On March 29, in an interview with ArmiaTV, Biletsky explained in detail the rationale behind his brigade’s conversion into an army corps, as well as the military-political context in which it is taking place. The interview provides insight into the current state of the Ukrainian-Russian war and the aspirations of the Third Corps’ new leader.

The structure of the corps and the reform of the Ukrainian military organization

In his interview, Biletsky outlined the reasons for the conversion of the Third Assault Brigade into a Ukrainian Army Corps.

According to the historical leader of the National Corps, the first and foremost advantage of the corps system is the emergence of a new, truly stable level of management for the Ukrainian army’s most powerful brigades. For them, converting into corps makes it possible to overcome the current situation, characterized by reliance on temporary command structures, lacking a stable personnel base and plagued by constant rotations of its members. These are structures in which, in practice, the level of competence of the assigned units and their commanders is unknown, which requires a significant amount of time to reach organizational and coordination agreements between units that do not truly work as a team. This is an ineffective model that, according to Biletsky, has contributed to increasing the number of casualties in the Ukrainian army.

By not depending on the usual rotations in these temporary structures and ensuring that there are no higher-level structures that condition the command of commanders in determining the relationships between brigades and units, the current Ukrainian brigades—in addition to being reinforced alongside other brigades in a joint military corps—will achieve true operational autonomy, facilitating the actions of their commanders and command teams. In this sense, the new Ukrainian corps will have their own command system, with a stable structure, and therefore with permanent operational capacity. The command of each corps will be fully responsible for its equipment, its professional training, its internal organization, and the manner of interrelations between its component units and brigades. This seeks to adapt the corps’ operations to the style and techniques of each corps’ commanders and facilitate compliance with single principles in the implementation of the action plan defined by the responsible commanders.

Another advantage of the new structure, according to Biletsky, is the possibility of more extensive and in-depth military action, in which direct control of all necessary operational units will allow for improved military performance: improved logistics, greater effectiveness in combat missions, and greater capacity to counter the resources of the Russian forces, particularly its drone system. With the planned autonomous command structure and the expansion of the brigades incorporated into each corps, effective action would be guaranteed, with rapid decision-making, within a range of 100 to 150 kilometers of territory on the battlefront (compared to the approximately thirty kilometers of operational autonomy of the current Ukrainian brigades). This, therefore, means having greater depth of action, “commensurate with a division and even an army.”

Ultimately, the creation of the new corps aims to improve Ukrainian military management when confronting an army, the Russian one, in which the leader of the Third Corps explicitly acknowledges an organizational advantage at present. The Ukrainian proposal seeks, in fact, to conform to the Russian Federation model, although attributing the functions of regiments to brigades and those of divisions (and, de facto, even armies, as the Third Corps undoubtedly intends) to corps.

It is verified that, although he attributes it to the fact that “Russia copies the United States in many ways,” Biletsky explicitly recognizes that the battalion-regiment-division-army model followed by the Russian Federation has placed the Russian army more favorably in its action from 2024 onwards compared to the difficult position that characterized it in 2022 and, to a lesser extent, in 2023. According to the now Colonel of the Third Corps, this new organization, accompanied by a centralization of control, supported by new operational forms, has allowed Russia to impose its current continuous offensive operation in different directions. “Russia has been more effective… it has advanced because it has moved into a full-scale, mechanized, industrial war action, which is the one currently underway,” he states.

Biletsky expects the new Ukrainian corps structure to be more effective than the Russian regimental-divisional system, which will depend, in his view, on the ability of Ukrainian commanders to adapt to the new framework for military action. This adaptation will not only result in the reorganization of the corps, but also in the command superstructures, which, in this case too, will be similar to the Russian ones, with a system of permanent administrative ties located above the corps structure (apparently with two levels of organization within that framework above that of the corps, according to Biletsky).

In the specific area of ​​the Third Corps, Biletsky will continue to insist on three-dimensional internal organization, placing the sergeant structure between the team of commanding officers and the rank-and-file soldiers. According to his view of the US Army’s organizational model (he mentions his contacts sometime between 2014 and 2016 with the command of the US 82nd Airborne Division), this structure constitutes the defining feature of an effective military structure on the ground (and also the main limitation of the Soviet Army). The Azovite colonel considers this model of military organization, supported by this middle-level command structure, to be one of the aspects that could once again put the Ukrainian Army in an advantageous position. This position, given the balance of power between the parties, is, to say the least, naive.

The process of military reorganization of the Armed Forces of Ukraine will, in any case, be slow, so the current phase can be considered transitional. It is not yet known which units will be integrated or created within the Third Corps, nor the specific phases of the reconversion of the current Third Brigade. Biletsky, who says he has not faced any recruitment restrictions (the Third Brigade has expanded its recruitment scope to include personnel from outside Ukraine to fill its Spanish Assault Battalion** or the new International Battalion), plans to relaunch the process in view of the prospect of a significant expansion of its personnel. The magnitude of the project and the time it requires indicate that Biletsky is not thinking solely about the needs of the war, but also about the day after.

The situation at the front and war fatigue

The interview with ArmiaTV is not only interesting for understanding the meaning of the reorganization of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, but also provides insights into the state of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict from the perspective of the political and military forces linked to the Azov movement.

Located on the Kupyansk-Borova axis, on a 50-kilometer front crucial to controlling the Oskol River, on the natural border between the two regions of Donbas and Kharkiv Oblast, the Third Brigade is positioned at one of the hot spots of the Russian Federation’s military advance. Biletsky places this action within the framework of the Russian concept of continuous offensive operations, through the constant deployment of reserves. “This operation is required to exhaust the troops,” he notes.

Although Biletsky mentions weaknesses in the Russian intervention model, which he considers “not very inclined to detailed planning of operations and advances” and high losses in equipment—a common mantra of Ukrainian propaganda—he recognizes improvements in the Russian army’s actions. In addition to its organizational model, he highlights action in small infantry groups, deployed over a vast territorial area but capable of converging on specific attack operations, the reinforcement of electronic warfare, the improvement of artillery action, and the use of unmanned systems. He also considers the decisive fact “of the differences in the number of troops on both sides.”

In a historical period in which the development of military equipment and unmanned systems makes the possibility of breakthroughs in the front extremely difficult, and in which Russian forces dominate in personnel, Biletsky suggests that the Russian forces do not really seek these breakthroughs. Rather, their objective is “the exhaustion of the Ukrainian forces, with a tactic of thousands of small incisions that leads to a general weakening along the thousand kilometers of front. They want to exhaust them morally and physically, so much so that this could lead to a collapse or to the realization of the impossibility of holding the front, of maintaining resistance, with the signing of some kind of capitulation.”

The tactic, according to Biletsky, is constant pressure along all, or almost all, of the front line. It is a war of attrition like the one that forced Finland into an agreement with the Soviet Union during World War II, resulting in significant territorial losses in the Karelia region.

Despite the Third Brigade’s recruitment success, Biletsky acknowledges that the unequal manpower of the Ukrainian army is not only linked to Russia’s demographic strength. He thus highlights the contradiction between a reality marked by the continuity of Ukrainian military action and the realization that “if the country is not fighting” (as normal life in Ukraine’s major cities reveals), “the soldier is not going to put in the effort.” Added to this is the chaos in the Ministry of Defense’s procurement, resulting in Ukrainian military units not receiving “even a fifth of what is needed,” with “a supply that doesn’t function properly.” Hence, all Ukrainian military units try to obtain additional materiel outside the Ministry of Defense and the state.

In this complicated context, it is striking that Biletsky insists in the interview that “a normal person wants peace, even a soldier” and that everyone is “extremely tired…, prepared, but extremely tired.”

The far right linked to the Azov movement, represented by the Third Corps commander, is therefore far from the optimism of victory and the desire for revenge that shaped the prevailing sentiments in the early years of the war, although it has not questioned the very limits that led it to opt for war since 2014. Thus, this commitment to peace by Biletsky’s group “does not mean that we are prepared and agree to cede territories and things like that,” but merely a recognition of the obvious fact that in Ukraine “everyone wants peace, I think.” It is a situation that, according to the Third Corps Colonel, “negatively affects soldiers, officers, and so on.” “People are thinking about other projects; they are not focused, as they were six months ago, exclusively on the war, on the fulfillment of duty. And that affects military work.” Although he points out that this does not affect the Third Brigade, the framework of negotiations determines, for example, a drop of around 15% in recruitment levels for the Ukrainian army.

Regarding the peace desired by groups like those linked to Azov, Biletsky emphasizes that only two armies in the world currently have real experience in warfare: Ukraine and Russia, the only countries that “really know how to fight a modern war.” He does not intend to underestimate armies like the French or British, which “have experience in recent conflicts, primarily of low intensity, but in any case, they have constant experience, are quite powerful with a fairly decent military mentality,” but “are not prepared” for modern warfare.

For that reason, the 20,000-30,000 troops that the United Kingdom, France, or Germany could send to Ukraine would be a limited force, even if accompanied by “50-100 aircraft and a few frigates or destroyers in the Black Sea.” This is why Biletsky, and the Ukrainian military-political structures in general, expect a framework for overcoming the war that is more closely linked to security guarantees.

In the European dimension, these security guarantees would actually be linked to the direct involvement of these countries in the war should the confrontation with Russia resume. According to Biletsky, President Zelensky’s conviction is that “it will probably be written into the final agreement that… in the event of a resumption of hostilities by Russia, the armies of these countries will go to war with Russia.”

Within the Ukrainian framework, Ukraine’s aim is to strengthen its national army. A major security factor would thus be, according to Biletsky, “a large Ukrainian army,” supported by European countries through “a fund for at least ten years to finance a group of 250,000 Ukrainians.” Ukraine, for its part, would contribute to directly maintaining a personnel capacity equivalent to consolidating an army of half a million people. An army of Ukrainian soldiers in which the leader of the Third Corps could trust more “because this is their land, because they have gone through what can only be learned with blood, these lessons come only with blood.” And, regarding the potential contribution of the Americans, he points out that they would only require intelligence data and communication systems, especially Starlink, although not only (for example, ARIS systems), in addition to air defense systems (Patriots and similar).

The “army” of the Third Corps

There is, of course, a strong group interest in the political-military model for exiting the crisis in the proposal to consolidate a strong professional Ukrainian army. According to Biletsky, this would allow “40 or 45% of the population to remain in the army, and that would lead to social peace within the country; these people wouldn’t have to look for work, at least at first; they don’t need much.” A militarized social peace to the liking of a movement whose symbol cannot hide its German inspiration and whose leader has a long history of belonging to some of the most radical far-right movements in Europe.

In this sense, the interview with Biletsky reveals the contradictory dynamics of a unit engaged in a difficult war, “for survival,” for control of “our home” and “our land,” with the possibility—for now still remote—of capitulation, but which, at the same time, clearly perceives the opportunity that the consolidation of the Third Corps represents for the group from Azov, with the possibility even of promoting the historic leader of the National Corps to generalship within the armed forces. The creation of the Third Corps actually opens the door to the formation of a true army led by commanders linked to Azov and the National Corps, one of the main components of the nationalist far right in Ukraine.

The Third Corps forces are also tired and say they desire peace, but they do not, nor does the Ukrainian establishment as a whole, renounce the pursuit of all their political objectives through war. If war proves necessary, should the Russian Federation refuse to surrender politically and militarily, they want a strong army, 50% financed by Europe and with the commitment of European countries to participate in the war.

In this context of war, the Third Corps sees the prospect of having up to 50,000 troops, which would place Biletsky’s forces among the main “armies” existing in Europe, surpassing the actual operational strength of the armies of states such as France and the United Kingdom, the most powerful in Europe. In this case, it would be an ultranationalist and far-right force with the capacity to influence the political and military policy not only of Ukraine, but of Europe as a whole.

Related:

3rd Army Corps formed on the basis of 3rd Assault

For three years, we have gained unique experience in fierce battles, conducted successful counteroffensives, and became the most effective in deploying drones on the front line.
We implemented technologies, changed the approach to personnel training, and created the best recruiting system in the country. We launched our own FPV and *ATGM schools. We initiated large-scale cultural and educational projects. Now it’s time to expand our horizons.

**3rd Assault Brigade forms International Battalions

In a similar approach, the 3rd Assault Brigade has formed two international battalions to help better integrate foreigners into its ranks. Foreigners, notably Canadians, have previously served in the ranks of the 3rd Assault Brigade, with it known that they have served in its 2nd Assault Battalion, 2nd Assault Company – according to the International Legion’s YouTube channel.

According to Telegram on January 6, 2025, affiliates with the International Legion announced that the 3rd Assault Brigade had begun to accept individuals who only spoke Portuguese; no English or Spanish was required as outlined in the post. It also exclaimed that the unit’s NCO core had significant combat experience.

On January 27, 2025, our contributors had discovered that, according to a fighter of the brigade on X (formerly Twitter), that an International Battalion had indeed been formed and that different languages were to be separated to improve cohesion amongst fighters. Not much is known regarding the battalion, with it still not having received an insignia or any official confirmation by the brigade’s media about its existence, however, it has been confirmed by several foreign volunteers and it is expected to be composed predominantly of English and Portuguese-speaking individuals.

In late February 2025, an image emerged of a new chevron belonging to the 3rd Assault Brigade, as well as a fighter of Spanish or Hispanic origin present in the photo with the insignia. Upon further investigation by our contributors, we discovered the creation of another international battalion by the brigade; with the unit being designated as “Tormenta Hispana” – translating to Spanish Storm.