While listening to an interview with David Petraeus on Iran International (run by Iranian opposition), I was struck by his mention of the “gated communities” concept for post-war Gaza (17:37). As the former commander of Multi-National Force – Iraq during the Iraq War, Petraeus oversaw various security strategies, including the implementation of walled-off neighborhoods designed to control movement and reduce violence. However, it appears that the U.S. military ultimately abandoned the idea, likely due to growing resistance from Iraqis, who viewed the barriers not as security measures but as a form of forced isolation.

Many Iraqis felt that these walls deepened sectarian divisions rather than improving safety, creating a sense of segregation that exacerbated tensions rather than alleviating them. The physical barriers disrupted daily life, restricting access to essential services and reinforcing a sense of occupation. Critics argued that instead of fostering stability, gated communities reinforced distrust and hindered efforts at reconciliation between different factions.

Despite searching for more details, I’ve found little publicly available information on how these communities were implemented and the specific reasons they were phased out. While resistance from Iraqis and concerns about segregation played a role, were there deeper strategic failures? Did the “gated communities” prove more disruptive than protective? The lack of documentation leaves open important questions about whether similar security measures in Gaza would face the same resistance or suffer from the same flaws.

When the concept of “security zones” in Gaza was discussed last year, it drew comparisons not only to the Strategic Hamlet Program from the Vietnam War but also to concentration camps. As documented by the Office of the Historian, the U.S.-backed Strategic Hamlet Program aimed to isolate rural populations from insurgents by relocating them into fortified villages, but the effort quickly faltered due to forced relocations, inadequate security, corruption, and growing distrust among Vietnamese civilians. Many villages were poorly defended and lacked sufficient infrastructure, leaving residents vulnerable and frustrated rather than protected. Instead of fostering stability, the program alienated local populations and unintentionally strengthened insurgent influence—a failure that underscores the dangers of imposing restrictive living conditions in conflict zones, as documented in the Battle for Hearts and Minds discussion.

The comparison to concentration camps underscores the severity of criticism surrounding such measures, particularly in cases where walls and enforced isolation limit civilian autonomy and movement. The historical precedent of the Strategic Hamlet Program raises critical questions about whether similar controlled zones or “gated communities” in Gaza might face the same resistance, unintended consequences, and long-term instability.

Now, as new security measures are being proposed in Gaza—including biometric-controlled zones—I see parallels to the previously discussed security models, including “gated communities” in Iraq, the Strategic Hamlet Program, and Israel’s extensive use of barriers. The West Bank barrier and the fortified Gaza border fence have long been points of contention, with supporters arguing they enhance security while critics claim they restrict Palestinian movement and deepen divisions. The recent expansion of security corridors, such as the Morag Corridor, further raises questions about whether these measures genuinely improve stability or merely reinforce control.

As discussions continue about “gated communities” and “security zones” in post-war Gaza, one question remains: Will these strategies succeed where others have failed, or are they doomed to repeat history? If history has taught us anything, the answer is already clear. Will they listen?