Negotiating positions: Russian security demands (original)
“According to Bloomberg, Putin seeks to restore Russia as a ‘great empire’ in Europe and will therefore continue to try to conquer the former Soviet republics and destroy NATO. I always say that it is the modern Ukrainian army, together with its allies and European troops, that is capable of destroying all Russian ambitions regarding war in Europe,” Andriy Yermak wrote yesterday, referring to an opinion piece titled “Putin Worries NATO Much More Than You Think,” in which, attributing to Russia intentions it hasn’t demonstrated and capabilities it doesn’t have, he insists that “it’s time to end the debate about whether there is a real risk of an attack on the alliance. There is.” This is exactly the kind of alarmist rhetoric Kiev wants to read in the Western press in order to continue insisting on force as the only acceptable solution.
Until yesterday, Ukraine had even cast doubt on its presence in Turkey, an obvious diversionary maneuver considering that Kiev cannot afford to make it seem to Donald Trump that it is not interested in the negotiation process in search of peace. It was only when Keith Kellogg, the most pro-Ukrainian member of the US foreign policy team, publicly stated that he had recommended that the Ukrainian team attend the meeting. “Part of life is showing up,” he said in an interview with ABC. Implicit in his words was the idea of pleasing Donald Trump and preventing the US president from once again blaming Kiev for the blockade in an attempt to achieve peace, in which, according to the general, he has put “his reputation” at stake.
Kellogg’s speech, which does not appear to expect any breakthrough at Monday’s meeting, has echoes of the moments when Victoria Nuland or Kurt Volker demanded that Ukraine extend the validity of the special status law for Donbass, which never came into force. As then, the objective is always to blame Russia for a blockade that has never been unilateral on the part of Moscow and to which Kyiv has decisively contributed. Every negotiation process has a degree of dramatization, and the current moment lends itself to it being the central element, especially when the parties to the negotiations have among their priorities appealing to the mediator to understand that it is the other side that makes peace impossible.
“Russia must be forced into peace by force. And the punishment for lying, the lack of the ‘memorandum’ promised to partners, and the lack of willingness to ceasefire must also be economically tangible for the Russians,” Andriy Yermak added in his message yesterday, insisting on the only line Kyiv has consistently maintained this week. Despite having confirmed its presence and insisting on a meeting between presidents, a proposal for which it has obtained the support of Turkey, which is trying to definitively position itself as a mediator, Ukraine insists on the need to obtain the Russian peace memorandum before the meeting. The logic is the same as that of the American journalist interviewing Keith Kellogg, who, when questioning why Moscow has not made the document public, added the comment that it was necessary for the memorandum to be delivered before the meeting “so we can prepare for it.”
Despite the exaggeration of the Russian threat in Europe, which curiously coincides with a time when Russian advances on the front—modest and slow, but real, unlike the imaginary Ukrainian control of parts of Kursk—do not prevent the proliferation of articles proclaiming that “Russia has begun to lose the war” and insisting on the content of the Russian memorandum, the situation remains the same. As usual, the only clarity regarding the state of the negotiation process comes from Keith Kellogg, who, from a clearly pro-Ukrainian perspective, does not hesitate to express his interest in achieving an end to the war. The general, initially appointed envoy for Russia and Ukraine but rejected by Moscow as a mediator, insisted again in his most recent interview that the United States has already received the memorandum, the term sheet, from Ukraine and for the first time clearly identified that document as the text obtained in London, that is, the road map proposed by Ukraine and its European allies.
During the conversation, the ABC journalist asked Keith Kellogg about the Russian terms, published as an exclusive by Reuters, which do not include the memo, but rather the Russian security demands. In contrast to the maximalist demands that Ukraine claims Russia made in Istanbul, requesting the entirety of the four southern regions where its troops are present and threatening Kiev with reclaiming more oblasts as a warning should the war continue, the article’s statement is closer to the negotiating terms Kellogg was demanding.
“President Vladimir Putin’s conditions for ending the war in Ukraine include a demand that Western leaders commit in writing to halt NATO’s eastward expansion and lift some of the sanctions imposed on Russia, according to three Russian sources with knowledge of the negotiations,” Reuters reports. As was made clear three years ago, and as the United States seems to have now understood, the main issue in resolving this war will not be territorial but rather security-related, a “fair” demand according to General Kellogg, who in the interview mentions Russia’s rejection of NATO membership for countries like Ukraine, “of course,” Moldova, and Georgia. In reality, the Reuters exclusive contains only one new development: the fact that Russia is demanding a firm, written commitment from NATO countries not to expand toward Russia’s borders.
The experience of the 1990s, when Gorbachev was unable to obtain in writing the implicit promise that the Cold War Alliance would not expand eastward, is now combined with the certainty that a president’s promises may not be perpetuated in time when a political change occurs. In his appearance on ABC, Kellogg insisted that, for the US administration, Ukraine’s NATO membership “is not on the table,” adding that “I can name four other countries” that “also have their doubts.” The general insisted that the security issue is what will define the process, but nonetheless reaffirmed the Ukrainian roadmap, which includes the military presence of NATO countries on Ukrainian territory, as a sensible and feasible document. In his contradictions, Kellogg, who minutes earlier had sided with Russia in its complaint about NATO’s expansion to its borders, highlights Finland’s fear of Russia and describes Russia’s construction of military bases near the Russian-Finnish border as a danger, in fact a consequence of the country’s abandonment of neutrality and its accession to the Alliance.
Recent experiences and the US’s inconsistency in fulfilling its promises make it unfeasible for Russia to accept NATO’s presence on its Ukrainian borders as part of a peace agreement, something that should be obvious to those who admit that the Alliance’s eastward expansion is a legitimate problem about which Moscow has a right to complain. However, sometimes with subtlety, sometimes with obvious contradictions, and recently also with threats and ceasefire orders via social media, Kellogg attempts to present the European plan to formalize NATO’s presence close to the front lines under conditions of armed peace, perpetual conflict, and without even offering a lifting of sanctions, as a practical roadmap that Russia should accept. This position, and not Russia’s refusal to publish the content of the peace memorandum—the negotiating position under which Moscow wants to negotiate directly with Ukraine and not with its allies—is currently the main obstacle to the diplomatic process even beginning.
If the negotiations continue—something that is not guaranteed, as it depends on Donald Trump’s interest in maintaining his involvement—the negotiation process will quickly run into the most obvious contradiction between the parties. The Reuters article adds another detail to Russia’s main demand. Until now, Moscow had always wanted to negotiate NATO’s non-expansion directly with the country that set the course, the United States. However, now, that promise—even signed as an agreement between countries—is no longer sufficient. Perhaps the ease with which Donald Trump got rid of the Iran nuclear deal, which Biden also failed to reinstate despite that having been his promise, weighs heavily on that logic. “All three Russian sources said Putin wants major Western powers to commit “in writing” not to expand the US-led NATO alliance eastward, shorthand for formally ruling out the accession of Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and other former Soviet republics,” Reuters explains . This is a reasonable demand on paper, but one that Moscow should have pursued in 1989, not 2025, when it is nothing more than a pipe dream.
Related:
Bloomberg: Putin Worries NATO Much More Than You Think
ABC: Trump ‘frustrated’ with Russia’s level of unreasonableness, U.S. special envoy says
Reuters: Trump envoy says Russian concern over NATO enlargement is fair
Exclusive: Putin’s demands for peace include an end to NATO enlargement, sources say
In 2021, just two months before the Russian invasion, Moscow proposed a draft agreement, with NATO members that, under Article 6, would bind NATO to “refrain from any further enlargement of NATO, including the accession of Ukraine as well as other States.” U.S. and NATO diplomats said at the time that Russia could not have a veto on expansion of the alliance.
Russia wants a pledge on NATO in writing because Putin thinks Moscow was misled by the United States after the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall when U.S. Secretary of State James Baker assured Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in 1990 that NATO would not expand eastwards, two of the sources said.
There was such a verbal promise, former Central Intelligence Agency Director William J. Burns said in his memoires, but it was never formalised – and it was made at a time when the collapse of the Soviet Union had not occurred.
NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev Heard
William J. Burns: Nyet Means Nyet
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