Note that Scarborough Shoal is in disputed territory: What’s Really Going On In the South China Sea Between the Philippines and China.
Scarborough Shoal Incident 2.0: The PLAN Inches Closer to War (archived)
A Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) destroyer and China Coast Guard (CCG) cutter collided 10.5 nautical miles east of Scarborough Shoal in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ) on the morning of 11 August. It marked the second time China has been embarrassed by the Philippines in these waters. This time, the results appear to have been deadly, as at least four members of the CCG were either severely injured or killed during the violent collision.
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The latest incident appears to have been set in motion by an order from a Chinese higher authority, most likely the Central Military Commission’s (CMC’s) Joint Operations Center (JOC), to disrupt the Philippine Coast Guard’s “Kadiwa ng Bagong Bayaning Mangingisda (KBBM)” program. The KBBM initiative was unveiled in May 2025 with the intent to provide Philippine fishermen with food security and resupply at sea [See KBBM, below]. Analysis of Automatic Identification System (AIS) data indicates many CCG cutters were arrayed around Scarborough Shoal on 11 August, and as Philippine CG cutters entered waters 20–30 nm around the shoal, CCG and PLAN ships converged on the Philippine cutters to disrupt their food supply operations.
For more than an hour, PLAN guided-missile destroyer Guilin and CCG cutter 3104 conducted a high-speed pursuit of the Philippine Coast Guard cutter BRP Suluan. Based on the events during this pursuit, it appears the CMC JOC ordered the use of physical force to stop the Philippine Coast Guard from their mission. According to Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff General Romeo Brawner, “Our assessment is that the real objective of the PLA Navy ship is to ram our Philippine Coast Guard (vessel). That is also (the) assessment of our Philippine Coast Guard.”
FYI, the author of the above article is one of the founding members of the hawkish Committee on the Present Danger: China. You’ll also find information on the first Scarborough Shoal incident in here, also known as the Scarborough Shoal standoff: August 11 SCS – James E. Fanell – SeaLight.
Background:
U.S. Embassy in the Philippines
U.S.-Supported Workshops Empower Fisherfolk, Strengthen Coastal Networks – U.S. Embassy in the Philippines (archived)
Manila, July 2, 2025—The U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, in partnership with IMPL-Project Philippines, trained over 180 fisherfolk from Zambales, Cagayan, and Sulu in a year-long program designed to expand their knowledge on sustainable fishing practices and to strengthen their ability in asserting their maritime rights in the South China Sea.
From June 2024 to May 2025, participating fisherfolk joined a series of workshops under the U.S. Embassy-sponsored “Empowering Coastal Communities in the Philippines” program, with trainers from the Philippine Coast Guard, the Philippine National Police Maritime Group, and the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources. They learned about maritime law enforcement, the Philippines’ sovereign maritime rights, strategies to combat illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU fishing), and strengthening community information campaigns. The program also enabled fisherfolk to explore alternative livelihood opportunities amid rising maritime tensions that have affected their access to traditional fishing grounds.
“It serves a vital role in mobilizing grassroots action and developing an informed citizenry to better address maritime challenges,” U.S. Embassy Deputy Director of Public Engagement Chad Kinnear said at the program’s closing event held in Masinloc, Zambales, on June 20.
A key outcome of the program was the establishment of three fisherfolk cooperatives: the Boundless Unity Steadfast and Inclusive Livelihood Agriculture Cooperative (BUSILAC) in Aparri, Cagayan; the Unified Livelihood Agriculture Cooperative (ULAC) in Zambales; and the Bangsa’Sug Fishermen Cooperative (BaSFC) in Sulu. These cooperatives will provide thousands of fisherfolk with access to formal support and income-generating opportunities, while reinforcing their legal recognition as key stakeholders in coastal governance.
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By expanding support for local fisherfolk, the United States remains committed to strengthening coastal resilience, advancing economic opportunities, and encouraging community-led solutions to maritime challenges in the region.
US-backed co-op aims to support livelihood of fisherfolk in Aparri | Global News (archived)
The US government and Impl. Project Philippines in 2020 launched the Unified Livelihood Agriculture Cooperative in Masinloc, Zambales, which provided 80 fisherfolk with training, safety equipment, and non-predatory low-interest loans that sustained their livelihood after the presence of foreign vessels prevented their access to their traditional fishing grounds in Scarborough Shoal.
Subsequently, the Bangsa’Sug Fisherfolks of Patikul Sulu was created in Jolo, Sulu earlier this year.
Zambales (in Central Luzon), Cagayan (in Northeastern Luzon), and Sulu (previously within the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, or BARMM) mark distinct regions across the Philippine archipelago. Sulu is located in the southern reaches of the country, known for the Sulu Sea and the deep oceanic trench that bears its name. In contrast, Luzon lies in the north—its northernmost provinces, like Cagayan and Batanes, facing Taiwan across the Luzon Strait, a strategic corridor that links the South China Sea to the Philippine Sea.
Bangsamoro, officially the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao:
The establishment of Bangsamoro was the culmination of several years of peace talks between the Philippine government and several autonomist groups; in particular the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which rejected the validity of the ARMM and called for the creation of a region with more powers devolved from the national government.
The Moro conflict was an insurgency in the Mindanao region in southern Philippines which involved multiple armed groups. A decades-long peace process has resulted in peace deals between the Philippine government and two major armed groups, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), but other smaller armed groups continue to exist. In 2017, the peace council settled around 138 clan conflicts.
Bangkok Blast: Who the Liars Say Did It, Says it All
US-Saudi funded and armed terrorist organizations like Abu Sayyaf, Jemaah Islamiah, and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) are already operating across Southeast Asia, and Jemaah Islamiah in particular has expressed support for Thailand’s southern violence.”
Malaysia Invaded – 100’s of Terrorists Land on Beaches, Western Media Mute
Terrorists are US-Saudi Funded Extremists – Part of Engineered Destabilization.
While the West pleads ignorance over the identity of the militants held up in the jungles of Malaysia’s Sabah state, the militant organizations themselves have declared thousands more in reinforcements are being arranged in the Philippines to join and exasperate the conflict. The Free Malaysia Today newspaper reported in its article, “10,000 Tausugs to sail to Sabah,” that :
Thousands of Tausug from Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi have sailed to Sabah to reinforce members of the so-called royal army of the sultanate of Sulu who are fighting it out with Malaysian security forces, a Moro National Liberation Front official said Tuesday.
The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) of course, is one of several of Al Qaeda’s franchises in Southeast Asia, and spun off the notorious terrorist organization, Abu Sayyaf, a US State Department-listed foreign terrorist organization with direct ties to Al Qaeda.
The Philippines’ terrorist organizations, located amongst the country’s southern islands have long held ties to Al Qaeda and receive funding and support from Saudi Arabia. AFP reported in their 2010 article, “WikiLeaks: US suspected Saudi ambassador to the Philippines of terror link,” that:
The United States suspected a Saudi Arabian ambassador to the Philippines of potential involvement in funding terrorists, according to US diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks this week.
The report would also state:
Francis Townsend cited Waly’s intervention to secure the release of two members of an Islamic charity detained in the Philippines, the cable showed.
The group was suspected of funnelling funds to Al-Qaeda-linked groups based in the southern Philippines.
It continued stating:
The February 24, 2007, US embassy cable named the charity suspected of terror financing in the Philippines as IIRO, which stands for the International Islamic Relief Organisation.
Intelligence agencies have said IIRO was set up by Muhammad Jamal Khalifa, a brother-in-law of Al-Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden.
The report concluded by stating:
Overall, the WikiLeaks cables singled out Saudi Arabia as the key source of funding for radical Islamist groups including Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hamas.
Saudi Arabia is of course is the chief financier of Al Qaeda, and is currently leading efforts to fund, arm, and fill the ranks of Al Qaeda’s franchises from Mali and Libya, to Syria and Iraq. A multitude of reports from across the West have identified Saudi Arabia as the lynch pin in Al Qaeda‘s global terror campaign, including the US Army West Point Combating Terrorism Center.
Its reports “Al-Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq” and “Bombers, Bank Accounts and Bleedout: al-Qa’ida’s Road In and Out of Iraq,” identify a vast terrorist network maintained by the Saudis that recruits, arms, and funds terrorists from across the Muslim World, and can funnel a mercenary army into any desired nation. At the time, the desired nation was Iraq. In 2011, it was Libya. Today it is Syria. The same network that US soldiers fought in Iraq is verifiably in use today, in support of US regime-change operations in Syria.
Impl. Project (Philippines) Grants from the U.S. State Department – Office of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs
USAspending.gov Search Query for Impl. Project
GRANT to IMPL PROJECT | USAspending
$241,500.00 – Completed
Start Date: September 30, 2022
End Date: October 1, 2024
Description:
FISHERFOLK COOPERATIVES FOR ENHANCED LIVELIHOODS AMONG COASTAL COMMUNITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES
Public Diplomacy Objectives:
To support the achievement of U.S. foreign policy goals and objectives, advance national interests, and enhance national security by informing and influencing foreign publics and by expanding and strengthening the relationship between the people and government of the United States and citizens of the rest of the world.
GRANT to IMPL PROJECT PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION INC. | USAspending
$104,633.26
Start Date: June 10, 2024
End Date: September 30, 2025
THIS PROJECT THIS PROJECT WILL SUPPORT A SERIES OF CAPACITY-BUILDING ACTIVITIES DESIGNED TO HELP FISHERFOLKS PURSUE OTHER SOURCES OF INCOME AND STRENGTHEN THEIR ADVOCACY CAMPAIGNS AGAINST IUU FISHING AND FOREIGN INCURSION INTO TERRITORIAL WATERS.
GRANT to IMPL PROJECT | USAspending
$70,000 (Ended)
Start Date: September 30, 2022
November 30, 2023
THIS PROJECT WILL SUPPORT THE ANALYSIS OF THE DATA ON ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE WEST PHILIPPINE SEA AND SHOW THE IMPACT OF SUCH UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES ON FILIPINOS THROUGH A PHOTO ROADSHOW
P4.9M FOOD PROCESSING AND PRODUCTION AREA TURNS OVER TO 7 SULU COOPS
Furthermore, the said cooperatives were former combatants from different groups such as Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces, Social Welfare Committee, Bangsamoro Women Auxillary Brigade, and many more.
Impl. Project (Philippines): Philippines Frontier Tech. Counter-PRC (2019) Case Study
Residents of Marawi still face a stagnant economy in the wake of the Marawi siege, and as a result, the most significant grievances are the lack of livelihood opportunities and mistrust in the local government. In addition, the majority Muslim citizens had a baseline 58% negative favorability rating towards the PRC, stemming from the PRC’s treatment of Uighur Muslims [see *Xinjiang*] and violations of The Philippines sovereignty. This percentage lept to 80% when the respondents, many of whom are less informed about global events, were shown news articles in Tagalog outlined the extreme mistreatment of Uighur Muslims at the hand of the PRC government.
The siege of Marawi (Filipino: Pagkubkob sa Marawi), also known as the Marawi crisis (Krisis sa Marawi) and the Battle of Marawi (Labanan sa Marawi), was a five-month-long armed conflict in Marawi, Philippines, that started on May 23, 2017, between Philippine government security forces against militants affiliated with the Islamic State (IS), including the Maute and Abu Sayyaf Salafi jihadist groups. The battle also became the longest urban battle in the modern history of the Philippines.
Part of the Moro conflict and the war against the Islamic State
The KBBM Program
Google AI: KBBM refers to the Kadiwa ng Bagong Bayaning Mangingisda (Kadiwa of the New Hero Fisherfolk) Program, a Philippine government initiative launched in May 2025 by the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) and the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) to support fishermen in the West Philippine Sea (WPS) South China Sea. The program involves deploying government-funded fish carriers to buy fresh catch at sea, provide fuel and ice subsidies, and establish a supply chain to improve fishermen’s livelihoods and enhance food security in the region.
Strengthening Maritime Presence: The KBBM program helps reinforce the Philippines’ presence and sovereignty in the resource-rich West Philippine Sea South China Sea.
Kadiwa ng bagong bayaning mangingisda (KBBM) launch in Bataraza, Palawan (archived)
“Our fisherfolk have long been at the frontlines—navigating not just the waves of the sea, but also the challenges of climate change, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and foreign incursions in the West Philippine Sea,” BFAR National Director Elizer Salilig said, who also previously served as the regional director of BFAR Mimaropa.
“With the KBBM Program, they are now suitably positioned to face these challenges. More than an economic intervention, KBBM is a statement of support and recognition. Our fisherfolk are not just workers of the sea—they are caretakers of marine ecosystems, pillars of food security, and defenders of our maritime domain,” he explained.
The KBBM Program aligns with President Marcos’ vision of strengthening domestic fish supply while promoting a whole-of-nation approach to protecting and maximizing the country’s maritime resources.
“As the WPS continues to play a crucial role in national security and food sovereignty, the KBBM Program stands as a beacon of resilience, unity, and forward-looking governance encouraging more Filipinos to reclaim their rightful place in these waters and secure a better future for the nation’s fisheries sector,” the DA-BFAR said.
Kadiwa for fishers to ensure food security, boost WPS presence: Palace (archived)
The Kadiwa ng Bagong Bayaning Mangingisda (KBBM) Program for Filipino fishermen would be sustained until the end of President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr.’s term to achieve food security and intensify presence in the West Philippine Sea (WPS), Malacañang said on Friday.
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Under the KBBM program of the Philippine Coast Guard and Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, M/V MAMAMALAKAYA was deployed to the waters near Bajo de Masinloc to directly purchase fresh catch from local fishermen.
Are The KBBM Fisherfolk Armed?
Crafting hybridity: institutionalizing and governing maritime militias’ public-private collaboration – refers to KBBM as a “New Fishery Management Plan.”
3.2 Emerging public-private collaboration: fragmented initiatives in Philippines and United States
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3.2.1 Maritime militias in Philippines
Articles cited: PH maritime militia plan a response to China’s gray zone tactic: analyst
Philippines Looks to Increase Maritime Capabilities in the SCS
Funding:
The author(s) declare that financial support was received for the research and/or publication of this article. Research for this article has been supported by the National Social Science Foundation of China (Grant number: 23CFX086).
The National Natural Science Foundation of China is an organization directly affiliated with China’s State Council: Main Responsibilities of The National Natural Science Foundation of China.
PH maritime militia plan a response to China’s gray zone tactic: analyst
Navy Chief Vice Admiral Giovanni Carlo Bacordo announced last week that about 240 militiamen would be deployed to the contested waters of the Scarborough Shoal and the Spratly Islands – recruiting fishermen and organizing them into seaborne militia units to counter China’s growing presence in the disputed waters.
Philippines Looks to Increase Maritime Capabilities in the SCS
As a result of the recent tensions over the incident, the need for enhancing Philippine maritime capabilities in the West Philippine Sea has been brought to light. During a press conference last week, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Romeo Brawner Jr. brought up a plan for a Philippine maritime militia that included both navy reservists and civilian fishermen. It should be noted that this is not a new concept, as a plan in 2020 called for a maritime militia force that would use existing militia organizations in the Philippines but in a maritime security role. According to Brawner, the current proposal is awaiting funds for vessels.
KBBM Updates
PBBM: PH to maintain defense despite latest incident in Bajo de Masinloc (archived)
BRP Suluan and another PCG ship, the BRP Teresa Magbanua, along with government-owned MV Pamamalakaya, were in Bajo de Masinloc [Scarborough Shoal] to carry out the “Kadiwa Para sa Bagong Bayaning Mangingisda” (KBBM) initiative for some 35 Filipino fishing vessels in the area.
Govt to intensify program for WPS fishers
The KBBM will be implemented in three phases until 2027, with the first phase covering the Kalayaan Group of Islands.
The second phase of the program will be carried out along Bajo de Masinloc, while the last phase will be implemented along portions of Northern Luzon, particularly in Benham Rise.
The initiative aims to give fishermen security in their traditional fishing grounds and bolster the country’s presence in the WPS amid China’s incursions in the country’s territorial waters.
Tarriela cited the need to continue protecting the WPS in the wake of China’s aggressive acts, saying the issue goes beyond politics and social needs.
“Our national identity is actually at stake in our fight at the West Philippine Sea,” he said.
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With President Marcos’ term ending in 2028, Tarriela raised concerns about the future of the WPS campaign.
He warned against electing a leader who might downplay the issue or compromise the country’s stance.
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On Friday, professors of the Graduate School of Law of San Beda University called on the United States to honor its commitment to its Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines, amid rising tensions in the South China Sea and the West Philippine Sea.
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They also noted the Bilateral Defense Guidelines between the two countries signed in 2023 that an armed attack in the Pacific, particularly “anywhere in the South China Sea, on either Philippine or US armed forces — which includes both nations’ coast guards, aircraft or public vessels” and stipulating with “unmistakable clarity” that this “would invoke mutual defense commitments under Article IV and Article V of the Mutual Defense Treaty.”
Any further updates will be made here: August 11 SCS – James E. Fanell – SeaLight