Board Games and Bottlenecks

Today, that logic lives on in U.S. efforts to counter China’s rise. Despite being a continental power within Eurasia, China remains vulnerable to maritime chokepoints – especially the Strait of Malacca, through which the majority of its energy imports pass. In response, China has been building overland alternatives that bypass U.S.-controlled sea lanes. Its Belt and Road Initiative, port acquisitions, and naval buildup are all attempts to circumvent these vulnerabilities. In turn, U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific – through alliances, naval patrols, and base agreements – echoes the same containment logic that animated Mackinder, Spykman, and Brzezinski.

Just weeks after the China–Iran rail corridor opened a land-based artery from Xi’an to Tehran, bypassing U.S.-patrolled waters, Washington responded with a different kind of message: bunker-busting bombs. The U.S. airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities weren’t an aberration – they were a continuation. In a region long fatigued by U.S. intervention, the strikes reaffirmed that the grammar of empire remains military. Meanwhile, this Belt and Road artery slashes freight time from 40 days by sea to just 15 by land, enabling Iran to export oil and import Chinese goods without navigating chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz. One opens a corridor; the other tries to collapse it.

The railway is more than a logistics upgrade – it’s a geopolitical maneuver. It links China to the Middle East and, eventually, to Europe, all while sidestepping chokepoints like the Suez Canal and the Strait of Hormuz. For Iran, it’s a sanctions workaround. For China, it’s a steel artery through the Rimland. And for Washington, it’s a direct challenge to the very doctrine that has guided U.S. grand strategy since 1992: prevent the rise of a rival capable of dominating Eurasia.