Tag: Code of conduct

SCS: PLA Navy ramps up training, patrols to deter potential provocation

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US keeps stoking tensions despite Philippine’s failed latest provocation

PLA Naval deterrence

The Chinese PLA Navy has reportedly ramped up training exercises and patrols in and near the South China Sea amid the recent tensions in the region caused by the Philippines’ continuous provocations.

A naval task force featuring landing ships the Danxiashan, the Laotieshan and the Lushan recently carried out a four-day all-weather full-course combat exercise in the South China Sea, as the warships practiced air defense, alongside berthing and personnel rescuing, China Central Television (CCTV) reported on Saturday.

Observers said these landing ships are of the Type 072 and Type 073 series, which are smaller than the PLA Navy’s Type 071 amphibious landing ship and Type 075 amphibious assault ship.

While the larger amphibious vessels can carry more troops and equipment and release them at a certain distance away from the shore, the smaller landing ships can conduct grounding operations directly on islands and reefs, giving the latter special roles to play, a Chinese military expert who requested anonymity told the Global Times on Sunday.

For example, Type 072 series landing ships have participated in multiple major military operations, including the building of the maritime observation station on Yongshu Jiao (also known as Yongshu Reef) in the Nansha Qundao (also known as the Nansha Islands) in the South China Sea in 1988, thepaper.cn reported.

The drills came after Philippine media reported the presence of a Type 071 amphibious landing ship and a Type 075 amphibious assault ship near the Nansha Qundao this month, as the PLA Navy has reportedly its vast amphibious arsenal deployed in the region. 

Amphibious vessels are not the only forces the PLA Navy has deployed in the South China Sea, as it has also sent some of its most powerful surface warships to the region for drills and patrols.

The armed forces of the Philippines on Friday confirmed the transit of four PLA Navy warships headed by the Type 055 large destroyer Dalian through the Balabac Strait on Wednesday, Philippine media outlet the Daily Tribune reported on Saturday.

The Philippine side said that the Balabac Strait, connecting the South China Sea and the Sulu Sea, “is commonly used by international vessels.”

Earlier this month, official Chinese media revealed that three other Type 055s, widely believed to be the world’s most powerful destroyer, the Xianyang, the Zunyi and the Yan’an, had also recently conducted round-the-clock long-endurance combat exercises in the South China Sea.

This means that all four Type 055 large destroyers currently in service with the navy of the PLA Southern Theater Command facing the South China Sea were sailing in or near the South China Sea recently.

PH: Compared To China, US Trade, Investment Offers Laughable + More

Ms. Cat1 Comment

Compared To China, US Trade, Investment Offers Laughable

On the other hand, the BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) donations of China alone that are reality– Chico River Irrigation Pump, Davao Bucana Bridge, Estrella-Pantaleon and Binondo-Intramuros Bridge, the ongoing Kaliwa Dam Project that would provide 600/mld (million liters per day) to drying Metro-Manila and hundreds other projects– already count billions of dollars, not to mention private investments like DITO Telecoms’ $ 3.9 billion investment in our telecom sector.

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Philippines counts the cost of tough South China Sea stance against Beijing

Ms. Cat2 Comments

Philippines counts the cost of tough South China Sea stance against Beijing

The Philippines has become a laboratory in responding to Beijing on the South China Sea row, taking the most risk but showing inconsistency and underwhelming results thus far. Its predicament explains why other Southeast Asian claimant states remain unlikely to follow its lead. The tepid reaction to Manila’s pitch for an Asean claimants-only Code of Conduct is indicative.

As had happened in the past, lost economic opportunities and further erosion of Manila’s position in the flashpoint, relative to other disputants, may lead to a possible policy reversal in handling the maritime tiff come the 2028 presidential election.

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Last year, the Philippines began to expose China’s illicit actions in the disputed waters. It inserted reporters in routine patrols and resupply sorties to document interference by the Chinese coastguard and maritime militia ships. The idea is to rally local and international support and impose reputational costs on Beijing. [Project Myoushu AKA Transparency Initiative]

This approach made strides in rousing public backing for Manila’s defence build-up, a stronger alliance with the United States, and a tougher stance against China. However, it also contributed to polarising domestic politics, affecting people-to-people ties and diminishing Chinese economic interest in the Philippines. Meanwhile, Beijing remains unmoved, weathering reputational costs and continuing to wield a capacity for escalation in the South China Sea.

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During Xi’s visit to Hanoi last December, both sides vowed to upgrade the Kunming-Haiphong rail line. In contrast, Chinese funding for three rail projects discussed during the previous Duterte government is already dead in the water. China is unlikely to become a strong partner for President Ferdinand Marcos Jnr’s Build Better More infrastructure programme.

Losses in the tourism sector have also become evident. In 2019, before the pandemic, China was the Philippines’ fastest-growing tourist market, with more than 1.7 million arrivals, or a 21.1 per cent market share, just behind South Korea. Last year, as countries in Asia raced to benefit from the return of Chinese tourists, the Philippines only welcomed over 260,000 tourists from China, with the market share shrinking to just 4.84 per cent.

Ironically, for all the talk about Duterte’s China policy as appeasement, it was under his watch that the Philippines made the biggest upgrade in infrastructure in the Spratlys since the 1970s. He also invested in modernising the country’s military, procuring modern frigates from South Korea, multirole response vessels from Japan and cruise missiles from India. All these happened while relations with China remained stable.

Another irony is that while Manila celebrates every resupply mission to the Second Thomas Shoal that successfully eluded the Chinese blockade, Vietnam is busy doing substantial reclamation on its Spratly outposts and gearing for a potential second airfield, with reportedly little interference from Beijing. [Bueller?]

These should offer plenty of insights as the strategy of the Philippines over the maritime squabble evolves.