Not Ready for the Big Leagues

To prosecute war against Russia, China, or Iran, protection of the major forward bases of the United States Air Force would be the prerequisite upon which success would be predicated.

To adequately cover even one of these large airbases against missile strikes of just 100-200 units of high-performance drones, cruise-missiles, ballistic missiles, and hypersonic missiles — plus numerous decoys — would easily require an entire Patriot battalion.

Even with a 100% interception rate, a pair of 100-missile strike packages over the course of a day would still compel a PAC-3 burn rate of at least 300 missiles, given that, as a general rule, two PAC-3 missiles are launched at every incoming target.

But of course, the interception rate would be considerably lower than 100%. And given that the Patriot command, radar, and launcher units — along with missile storage sites — would be primary targets, there would be a substantial attrition rate of the highly immobile Patriot systems themselves. (The Russians have already clearly demonstrated the vulnerability of the Patriot systems to counter-battery missile strikes. At least three Patriot batteries have been destroyed in Ukraine.)

In an attempt to cover just three large airbases against a series of salvos of 100+ missiles of various types, the entire US stockpile of PAC-3 interceptors could very conceivably be exhausted in little more than a week or two.

Current annual production could easily be consumed in little more than a day or two.

This is the reality of 21st century high-intensity conflict against an adversary with the capability to shoot back — a kind of war for which the United States military is woefully ill-prepared, both materially and doctrinally.