Tag: Luzon

South China Sea: Philippines’ anti-ship missile base puts Scarborough Shoal in cross hairs (more information)

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What the article left out is; to shoot far, the Philippine military needs to see far. However, the Philippines don’t have any over-the-horizon (OTH) radar, military satellites, AWACS planes or other long-range ISR capabilities, to make use of the full range of the BrahMos missile. Without it the missile is limited to the range of its available ISR assets, which are measured in just dozens of kilometers.

However, if a BrahMos missile is ever launched against a long-range Chinese target, it will be easy to guess who would have supplied the essential Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) information and target identification to the Philippine military.

StarBoySAR

South China Sea: Philippines’ anti-ship missile base puts Scarborough Shoal in cross hairs

Even if the Philippines lacks the advanced communications, intelligence, and targeting systems needed to maximise the BrahMos’ capabilities, it could still leverage US support in these areas, Koh said, citing the sinking of Russia’s Moskva warship by Ukraine in 2022, which he said was achieved thanks to “targeting support provided by Kyiv’s allies, chiefly the Americans”.

The flagship of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, the Moskva became the largest warship lost in combat since the second world war when it was hit by two Ukrainian Neptune anti-ship missiles in April 2022. US officials later told the media that the Pentagon had provided intelligence that led to the ship’s sinking.

For the Philippines, the BrahMos missiles are “significant game changers” [🙄], according to security strategist Chester Cabalza, president of the International Development and Security Cooperation think tank in Manila.

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However, Don McLain Gill, an international-studies lecturer at De La Salle University in the Philippines, questioned whether the BrahMos purchase alone would deliver robust deterrence against China.

“It will be crucial for the BrahMos to be supplemented by efficient intelligence, surveillance, target-acquisition and reconnaissance, which is critical to track targets and ensure they can be used by command,” he said, warning Manila must invest further to maximise the missiles’ deterrent value.

Previously:

Philippines Builds First BrahMos Anti-Ship Missile Base Facing South China Sea

Philippine ruling elite whips up anti-China campaign to justify alignment with US war plans

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As the United States steps up its campaign to provoke China into war, the Philippines has lined up behind Washington, increasingly transforming the country into a lead attack dog in the region for American imperialism. Seeking to obscure the fact that the country has now been placed on the front lines of a catastrophic conflict, the Philippine ruling elite is demonizing China and people of Chinese ethnicity with absurd and lurid claims that Beijing is infiltrating spies into the country.

Philippine ruling elite whips up anti-China campaign to justify alignment with US war plans

Is the Philippines becoming a US ‘proxy’ against Beijing in the South China Sea?

Ms. Cat

Is the Philippines becoming a US ‘proxy’ against Beijing in the South China Sea?

‘The ants that get trampled on’

Not everyone agrees with drawing closer to the US, however, and they warn about the Philippines turning into a “proxy” for American interests. The president’s own sister Imee, a senator, told ANC Digital earlier this month that “China will always be our neighbour, we have no fight with them, let’s not get dragged into a fight that’s not our own.”

Anna Rosario Malindog-Uy, director of the pro-China Asian Century Philippines Strategic Studies Institute, wrote in the Manila Times on February 10 that “agreements such as the EDCA, the VFA and the Mutual Defence Treaty have not only cemented the US military presence and influence in the Philippines but also, most importantly, exemplified the Philippines’ dependence on the US in the military and defence sector.”

Teresita Ang See, former president of the Philippine Association for Chinese Studies and currently part of its advisory council, told This Week in Asia: “Filipinos in general condemn China’s action. But many also understand that China’s assertiveness is in response to US, Japanese and Australian provocations and increasing military presence in the Philippines.”

She warned that “we are fighting a proxy war between the US and China and in the end we will be the ants that get trampled upon”.

H/T: Johnsonwkchoi

Related:

Responding to the Catholic Bishops

Philippines counts the cost of tough South China Sea stance against Beijing

Philippines counts the cost of tough South China Sea stance against Beijing

Ms. Cat2 Comments

Philippines counts the cost of tough South China Sea stance against Beijing

The Philippines has become a laboratory in responding to Beijing on the South China Sea row, taking the most risk but showing inconsistency and underwhelming results thus far. Its predicament explains why other Southeast Asian claimant states remain unlikely to follow its lead. The tepid reaction to Manila’s pitch for an Asean claimants-only Code of Conduct is indicative.

As had happened in the past, lost economic opportunities and further erosion of Manila’s position in the flashpoint, relative to other disputants, may lead to a possible policy reversal in handling the maritime tiff come the 2028 presidential election.

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Last year, the Philippines began to expose China’s illicit actions in the disputed waters. It inserted reporters in routine patrols and resupply sorties to document interference by the Chinese coastguard and maritime militia ships. The idea is to rally local and international support and impose reputational costs on Beijing. [Project Myoushu AKA Transparency Initiative]

This approach made strides in rousing public backing for Manila’s defence build-up, a stronger alliance with the United States, and a tougher stance against China. However, it also contributed to polarising domestic politics, affecting people-to-people ties and diminishing Chinese economic interest in the Philippines. Meanwhile, Beijing remains unmoved, weathering reputational costs and continuing to wield a capacity for escalation in the South China Sea.

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During Xi’s visit to Hanoi last December, both sides vowed to upgrade the Kunming-Haiphong rail line. In contrast, Chinese funding for three rail projects discussed during the previous Duterte government is already dead in the water. China is unlikely to become a strong partner for President Ferdinand Marcos Jnr’s Build Better More infrastructure programme.

Losses in the tourism sector have also become evident. In 2019, before the pandemic, China was the Philippines’ fastest-growing tourist market, with more than 1.7 million arrivals, or a 21.1 per cent market share, just behind South Korea. Last year, as countries in Asia raced to benefit from the return of Chinese tourists, the Philippines only welcomed over 260,000 tourists from China, with the market share shrinking to just 4.84 per cent.

Ironically, for all the talk about Duterte’s China policy as appeasement, it was under his watch that the Philippines made the biggest upgrade in infrastructure in the Spratlys since the 1970s. He also invested in modernising the country’s military, procuring modern frigates from South Korea, multirole response vessels from Japan and cruise missiles from India. All these happened while relations with China remained stable.

Another irony is that while Manila celebrates every resupply mission to the Second Thomas Shoal that successfully eluded the Chinese blockade, Vietnam is busy doing substantial reclamation on its Spratly outposts and gearing for a potential second airfield, with reportedly little interference from Beijing. [Bueller?]

These should offer plenty of insights as the strategy of the Philippines over the maritime squabble evolves.