Andriy Biletsky’s Third Corps

Note: The 3rd Assault Brigade is widely regarded as the successor to the Azov Battalion, a unit originally founded by Neo-Nazi Andriy Biletsky. The battalion, later expanded and reorganized into the Azov Regiment, underwent rebranding amid evolving military and political dynamics, eventually forming the core of the current brigade.

El Tercer Cuerpo de Andriy Biletsky (Andriy Biletsky’s Third Corps)

On March 14, Colonel Andriy Biletsky, commander of the Third Assault Brigade, announced its conversion into the Third Corps of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, a formation that will remain under his command. In a video sharing the news on Instagram, Biletsky stated:

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Jeffrey Sachs Discusses The War in Ukraine, ‘Shock Therapy,’ and More

Jeffrey Sachs Discusses The War in Ukraine, ‘Shock Therapy,’ and More

Perhaps the most stunning bit of information in the interview comes from Sachs’s disclosure of the reason for the failure of “Shock therapy” in Russia. “Shock therapy” is the name given to the abrupt transition from the Soviet-style command economy to a market-oriented economy. It was a success in Poland, but a failure in Russia where it led to a depression deeper and more costly than our own Great Depression. Why? Sachs was an advisor to Poland and then Russia for the “therapy.” So he had witnessed a “controlled experiment,” as he put it elsewhere. At a certain point it the process, financial help from the outside was needed to revive the economy on a new basis. It was provided to Poland; but when Sachs called for the same help in Russia, it was refused by the West, specifically by the White House. This happened despite Sachs’s direct pleas to the White House. The depression that followed was neither accidental nor a surprise. Far from it. This was the first time that the US attempted to “weaken” post-Cold War Russia, an attempt that was eventually reversed under Putin.

Related:

Russian aid controversy:

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) funded a project by the HIID to help rebuild the Russian economy on the basis of western concepts of ethics, democracy and free markets. Jeffrey Sachs was said to have “packaged HIID as an AID consultant”. USAID were glad to accept help from Harvard, since they lacked expertise for such a project. The HIID oversaw and guided disbursement of $300 million of US aid to Russia with little oversight by USAID. HIID advisers worked closely with representatives from Russia, notably Anatoly Chubais and his associates. Once USAID accepted help from the HIID, HIID was in a position to recommend U.S. aid policies while being a recipient of that aid. It also put the HIID in a position of power overseeing some of their competitors. The project, which ran from 1992 to 1997, was headed by economist Andrei Shleifer and lawyer Jonathan Hay. HIID received $40.4 million in return for its activities in Russia, awarded without the normal competitive bidding approach.

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An Ominous Murder in Moscow

Disclaimer: The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and may or may not reflect those of Ms. Cat’s Chronicles.

An Ominous Murder in Moscow

The second thought was a byproduct of the first. The prospect of sudden escalation reminded me of a podcast conversation I listened to seven weeks into the war—a conversation that left me more worried than ever that American foreign policy is not in capable hands. The killing of Dugina, in a roundabout way, corroborates that worry.

The conversation was between Ryan Evans, host of the War on the Rocks podcast, and Derek Chollet, who, as Counselor of the State Department, reports directly to Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Chollet was recounting diplomatic discussions between Moscow and Washington that had taken place before the invasion. He said something that had never before been officially confirmed: The US had refused to negotiate with Russia about keeping Ukraine out of NATO.

What bothered me wasn’t this disclosure; I’d already gathered (and lamented) that the Biden administration had refused to seriously engage Russia’s main stated grievance. What bothered me—and kind of shocked me—was how proud Chollet seemed of the refusal.

After all, when negotiations aimed at preventing the invasion of a nation you’re friends with are followed by the invasion of that nation, that’s not success, right? Apparently by Chollet’s lights it was.

Last week John Mearsheimer (who seven years ago predicted eventual Russian invasion if the NATO expansion issue wasn’t addressed) published a piece in Foreign Affairs warning that as this war drags on, “catastrophic escalation” is a real possibility. Some people dismissed scenarios he sketched as conjectural. Yet exactly one day after his piece appeared, the real world provided us with a new scenario: daughter of iconic Russian nationalist murdered, leaving her aggrieved father to whip up support for a longer and bloodier and possibly wider war. Every day of every war brings the possibility of an unsettling surprise.

Listening to Chollet talk about what a strategic loss this war is for Putin, I was struck by how excited he sounded about that and by how youthful and naïve his excitement seemed. It would have been poignant if it weren’t scary. And I’ve seen no evidence that his boss at the State Department is more reflective than he is. Our foreign policy seems driven by two main impulses—macho posturing and virtue signaling—that work in unfortunate synergy and leave little room for wisdom.

Bringing this tragic war to a close is something that’s hard to do in the near term and is impossible to do without painful compromise. But I see no signs that the US is even contemplating such an effort, much less laying the groundwork for it. I worry that Chollet’s attitude in April—what seemed like a kind of delight in the prospect of a war that is long and costly for Russia—may still prevail in the State Department. So it’s worth repeating:

(1) A massively costly war for Russia can be a massively costly war for Ukraine and, ultimately, for Europe and for the whole world; and (2) Every day this war continues there’s a chance that we’ll see some wild card—like the murder of Daria Dugina—that makes such a lose-lose outcome more likely.