The LCS has just what the Navy needs to defend freedom of the seas in the first island chain.
Littoral Combat Ships for Maritime COIN
Previously:
Littoral Combat Ship Still Fighting to Prove Its Worth
Bringing Vietnamese Counterinsurgency To The Philippines And South China Sea (Part I) – Analysis
Clip from Episode 1 of Why Should We Care About the Indo-Pacific? Podcast (Apple Podcasts) with Ray Powell and Jim Carouso.
Powell and Carouso worked together at the U.S. Embassy in Canberra, Australia. They’re trying to “shape” the Indo-Pacific for US corporate interests and to provoke a war with China.
Jim Carouso is currently with the Center for Strategic & International Studies. CSIS is funded by various governments, including the United States, and corporations. Carouso is also with BowerGroupAsia in Singapore. He formerly worked in the State Department and was a chargé d’ affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Canberra and the U.S. Mission to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
Ray Powell was formerly a Defense Attaché in Canberra, Australia.
The Defense Attaché System is part of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
More on SeaLight’s (formerly Project Myoushu) ‘assertive transparency’ campaign.
Previously:
SCS: The Office of Naval Research funded Stanford’s GKC
Philippines’ ‘assertive transparency’ strategy is causing them to miss out economically
PH: Compared To China, US Trade, Investment Offers Laughable + More
The Philippines is going all in with the United States and bracing itself against lost Chinese largesse. President Ferdinand Marcos Jnr will fly to Washington next month to attend the US-Japan-Philippines trilateral leaders’ summit. It will be his fourth visit to the US since taking office as president less than two years ago.
South China Sea: Philippines must softly manage disputes or miss out economically
Previously:
PH: Compared To China, US Trade, Investment Offers Laughable + More
The Office of Naval Research is an organization within the US Department of Navy. Ray Powell’s Project Myoushu started at Stanford’s GKC. Funny how Powell’s information has disappeared from Stanford’s GKC. The internet never forgets, though!
Perry World House’s Thomas Shattuck and Robin Garcia are out with an important new white paper which recommends the public release of visual information to counter China’s coercive activities, using the Philippines and Taiwan as examples. As the champions of “assertive transparency”, SeaLight enthusiastically welcomes this timely new scholarship!
Lighting Up the Gray Zone: The Philippines-Taiwan Counter-Coercion Toolkit
Perry World House is at the University of Pennsylvania, another university funded by the US government. I’ve updated my Project Myoushu document, to reflect the following:
The origin of Stanford University’s Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation. It’s sponsored by the Office of Naval Research, an organization within the Department of Navy. I saw it over at the Asian Century Journal, yesterday.
From a previous post.
Related:
As a result of the incident, Powell thinks that Manila “has the right to expect a more muscular response from its partners and allies.” After last year’s incidents, both the U.S. and Australia held joint maritime and aerial patrols with Philippine military forces in the South China Sea. The Philippines expects to hold more joint patrols with not only American and Australian forces, but also with countries such as France, Canada and Japan.
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Yesterday, Philippine President BongBong Marcos vowed that the country would “push back” when its sovereignty was ignored in reference to China’s actions in the region during a speech in Australia. He further stressed that the Philippines’ stance on the South China Sea was guided by its interests, not at the “beck and call” of the United States.
BBM was at the Lowy Institute, a think tank funded by the Australian government, etc.
Related:
Philippines Budgets for a Permanent Base at Second Thomas Shoal
It’s Time to Build Combined Forward Operating Base Sierra Madre
Philippines Game Changer Analysis – Project Myoushu – South China Sea
Teodoro led another spin-off, the troop increase for Batanes talking tough to provoke China on Taiwan on which the Philippines has no concern at all
Ex-USAF colonel runs Philippines SCS show
Related:
I’m tired, right now, but I wanted to update on this. It’s also available on my documents page. I’ve combined a couple of other documents with it, that I was working on. To be honest, I’m getting burned out on it. I might polish it up, at a later date, as it’s 36 pages.
Philippines counts the cost of tough South China Sea stance against Beijing
The Philippines has become a laboratory in responding to Beijing on the South China Sea row, taking the most risk but showing inconsistency and underwhelming results thus far. Its predicament explains why other Southeast Asian claimant states remain unlikely to follow its lead. The tepid reaction to Manila’s pitch for an Asean claimants-only Code of Conduct is indicative.
As had happened in the past, lost economic opportunities and further erosion of Manila’s position in the flashpoint, relative to other disputants, may lead to a possible policy reversal in handling the maritime tiff come the 2028 presidential election.
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Last year, the Philippines began to expose China’s illicit actions in the disputed waters. It inserted reporters in routine patrols and resupply sorties to document interference by the Chinese coastguard and maritime militia ships. The idea is to rally local and international support and impose reputational costs on Beijing. [Project Myoushu AKA Transparency Initiative]
This approach made strides in rousing public backing for Manila’s defence build-up, a stronger alliance with the United States, and a tougher stance against China. However, it also contributed to polarising domestic politics, affecting people-to-people ties and diminishing Chinese economic interest in the Philippines. Meanwhile, Beijing remains unmoved, weathering reputational costs and continuing to wield a capacity for escalation in the South China Sea.
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During Xi’s visit to Hanoi last December, both sides vowed to upgrade the Kunming-Haiphong rail line. In contrast, Chinese funding for three rail projects discussed during the previous Duterte government is already dead in the water. China is unlikely to become a strong partner for President Ferdinand Marcos Jnr’s Build Better More infrastructure programme.
Losses in the tourism sector have also become evident. In 2019, before the pandemic, China was the Philippines’ fastest-growing tourist market, with more than 1.7 million arrivals, or a 21.1 per cent market share, just behind South Korea. Last year, as countries in Asia raced to benefit from the return of Chinese tourists, the Philippines only welcomed over 260,000 tourists from China, with the market share shrinking to just 4.84 per cent.
Ironically, for all the talk about Duterte’s China policy as appeasement, it was under his watch that the Philippines made the biggest upgrade in infrastructure in the Spratlys since the 1970s. He also invested in modernising the country’s military, procuring modern frigates from South Korea, multirole response vessels from Japan and cruise missiles from India. All these happened while relations with China remained stable.
Another irony is that while Manila celebrates every resupply mission to the Second Thomas Shoal that successfully eluded the Chinese blockade, Vietnam is busy doing substantial reclamation on its Spratly outposts and gearing for a potential second airfield, with reportedly little interference from Beijing. [Bueller?]
These should offer plenty of insights as the strategy of the Philippines over the maritime squabble evolves.
Ms. Cat’s Chronicles 
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