Militant groups, civil society organizations, and members of religious congregations will mount a three-day major rally and vigil from June 9 (Monday) to June 11, (Wednesday) to call on the Senate to proceed with the impeachment trial of Vice President Sara Duterte.
The recent release of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations’ preliminary report on the arrest of former President Rodrigo Duterte has sent ripples through the Philippine legal and political landscape. Chaired by Senator Imee Marcos, the report outlines what it calls “glaring violations” of constitutional rights, procedural lapses, and questionable coordination between the Philippine government and the International Criminal Court (ICC).
As for President Marcos, he may have a solid plan to neutralize the Dutertes but it is the anguish of ordinary citizens reeling from high prices and low wages that he should be worried about. Even Vice President Sara Duterte is aware that the concern of the average voter is the economic crisis, which is why her arrival statement at The Hague when she visited her father focused on the need to address poverty, hunger, and joblessness in the Philippines. In other words, the most serious threat to the Marcos presidency is its own failure to fulfill the campaign promise of bringing down the price of rice and other goods, uplift the conditions of working families, and provide adequate and affordable services to the people.
Three years ago, the most powerful political families in the Philippines joined hands to secure the nation’s biggest election victory in four decades. Now they are locked in a feud that threatens to derail one of Asia’s economic growth stars.
In dramatic events on Tuesday, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s government arrested and deported his predecessor Rodrigo Duterte to face the International Criminal Court in The Hague. The move came just over a month after the impeachment of his daughter, Vice President Sara Duterte, by allies of Marcos. A Senate trial, which would determine whether she gets removed from office, is scheduled to begin in July.
Sara Duterte, left, with Ferdinand Marcos Jr. in 2022. Photographer: Ezra Acayan/Getty ImagesRead More »
MANILA – President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. on Friday signed laws declaring the maritime zones under Philippine jurisdiction and designating sea lanes in the country for foreign vessels and aircraft.
The South China Sea Arbitration did not rule on sovereignty, and China does not recognize it because the Arbitral Tribunal lacked jurisdiction. “The Arbitral Tribunal violated the principle of state consent, exercised its jurisdiction ultra vires and rendered an award in disregard of the law. This is a grave violation of UNCLOS and general international law, Wang said.” The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is an international treaty that establishes a legal framework for all marine and maritime activities. The Permanent Court of Arbitration is not an agency of the United Nations. The PCA rents space in the same building as the UN’s International Court of Justice. A Congressional Research Service report, dated August 2023, stated that the U.S. has not declared its position regarding sovereignty over any of the geographical elements that comprise the South China Sea.
The Philippines and China have just restored peace and stability in the areas of the South China Sea contested by the two countries in a July 21, 2024 “de-escalation” deal that aimed at “easing tensions.”
As the United States steps up its campaign to provoke China into war, the Philippines has lined up behind Washington, increasingly transforming the country into a lead attack dog in the region for American imperialism. Seeking to obscure the fact that the country has now been placed on the front lines of a catastrophic conflict, the Philippine ruling elite is demonizing China and people of Chinese ethnicity with absurd and lurid claims that Beijing is infiltrating spies into the country.
Renewed talks on a bill that would reinstate a mandatory Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) programme in colleges and universities in the Philippines has sparked debate on whether it would be effective in strengthening the country’s military amid growing tensions in the South China Sea.
The Philippines has become a laboratory in responding to Beijing on the South China Sea row, taking the most risk but showing inconsistency and underwhelming results thus far. Its predicament explains why other Southeast Asian claimant states remain unlikely to follow its lead. The tepid reaction to Manila’s pitch for an Asean claimants-only Code of Conduct is indicative.
As had happened in the past, lost economic opportunities and further erosion of Manila’s position in the flashpoint, relative to other disputants, may lead to a possible policy reversal in handling the maritime tiff come the 2028 presidential election.
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Last year, the Philippines began to expose China’s illicit actions in the disputed waters. It inserted reporters in routine patrols and resupply sorties to document interference by the Chinese coastguard and maritime militia ships. The idea is to rally local and international support and impose reputational costs on Beijing. [Project Myoushu AKA Transparency Initiative]
This approach made strides in rousing public backing for Manila’s defence build-up, a stronger alliance with the United States, and a tougher stance against China. However, it also contributed to polarising domestic politics, affecting people-to-people ties and diminishing Chinese economic interest in the Philippines. Meanwhile, Beijing remains unmoved, weathering reputational costs and continuing to wield a capacity for escalation in the South China Sea.
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During Xi’s visit to Hanoi last December, both sides vowed to upgrade the Kunming-Haiphong rail line. In contrast, Chinese funding for three rail projects discussed during the previous Duterte government is already dead in the water. China is unlikely to become a strong partner for President Ferdinand Marcos Jnr’s Build Better More infrastructure programme.
Losses in the tourism sector have also become evident. In 2019, before the pandemic, China was the Philippines’ fastest-growing tourist market, with more than 1.7 million arrivals, or a 21.1 per cent market share, just behind South Korea. Last year, as countries in Asia raced to benefit from the return of Chinese tourists, the Philippines only welcomed over 260,000 tourists from China, with the market share shrinking to just 4.84 per cent.
Ironically, for all the talk about Duterte’s China policy as appeasement, it was under his watch that the Philippines made the biggest upgrade in infrastructure in the Spratlys since the 1970s. He also invested in modernising the country’s military, procuring modern frigates from South Korea, multirole response vessels from Japan and cruise missiles from India. All these happened while relations with China remained stable.
Another irony is that while Manila celebrates every resupply mission to the Second Thomas Shoal that successfully eluded the Chinese blockade, Vietnam is busy doing substantial reclamation on its Spratly outposts and gearing for a potential second airfield, with reportedly little interference from Beijing. [Bueller?]
These should offer plenty of insights as the strategy of the Philippines over the maritime squabble evolves.
Moreover, the involvement of Subic Bay, a location not officially listed as a site/base under the expanded Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) as the alleged destination of US military fuel from Pearl Harbor, prompts a critical inquiry about its role and whether it might be serving as an unofficial or de-facto EDCA site. Hence, it begs to inquire if Subic Bay is now effectively functioning as a de-facto EDCA site. And if so, could there be other undeclared de-facto EDCA sites serving similar purposes other than the nine declared ones?
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Could it be posited that the current Philippine administration appears to prioritize the demands and interests of the United States over its own national interests, sovereignty, and independence, suggesting a level of deference that could be interpreted as reminiscent of a vassal state? This perspective raises questions about the autonomy of the Philippine political leadership and the extent to which it serves the interests of its citizens first and foremost. The lack of public discussion, accountability, and transparency on matters that potentially impinge on national sovereignty could be seen as indicative of a disproportionate influence by the U.S. on Philippine domestic affairs and foreign policy, prompting a reevaluation of the true nature of the bilateral relationship between the two nations.
Ms. Cat’s Chronicles 
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