Tag: US Naval Base Subic Bay

Hegseth visits Manila: Washington prepares for war with China + More

Tina Marie (Ms. Cat)

Hegseth visits Manila: Washington prepares for war with China

The language of Hegseth’s press conference in Manila is indicative of the openly aggressive face of US imperialism under Trump. Gone was any reference to what had been the political shibboleth of Washington in the Asia Pacific region: the defense of “freedom of navigation.” Hegseth spoke rather of “preparing for war,” using the phrase more than once. Every time Hegseth mentioned China he termed it “Communist China,” and spoke of its “aggression.” Hegseth referred to US Seventh fleet commander Admiral Samuel Paparo “and his war plans. Real war plans.”

Read More »

EDSA1: The Snap Revolution

Tina Marie (Ms. Cat)
Christopher Hitchens: Hitch 22

Off to the side was a more youthful Wolfowitz. He told me that this picture, which had pride of place in his office, was of exactly the moment when the Reaganites had narrowly voted to dump the Ferdinand Marcos dictatorship in the Philippines in 1986 and to recognize the election victory of his opponent Cory Aquino.* “It was the first argument I won,” said Wolfowitz proudly. “I said that if we supported a dictator to keep hold of a base, we would end up losing the base and also deserving to do so. Whereas,” he went on, “by joining the side of ‘people power’ in Manila that year, we helped democracy movements spread through Taiwan and South Korea and even I think into Tiananmen Square in 1989.“

* See, for the best account of this upheaval in real time, James Fenton’s book The Snap Revolution.

Related:

*The Snap Revolution (Part One: The Snap Election) | James Fenton

*The Snap Revolution (Part Two: The Narrow Road to the Solid North)

*The Snap Revolution (Part Three: The Snap Revolution)

Previously: PH’s EDSA1 AKA People Power Revolution

Google Document: PH’s EDSA1 AKA People Power Revolution & Chile’s 1988 Plebiscite

Tiananmen Square

Is the Philippines becoming a US ‘proxy’ against Beijing in the South China Sea?

Tina Marie (Ms. Cat)

Is the Philippines becoming a US ‘proxy’ against Beijing in the South China Sea?

‘The ants that get trampled on’

Not everyone agrees with drawing closer to the US, however, and they warn about the Philippines turning into a “proxy” for American interests. The president’s own sister Imee, a senator, told ANC Digital earlier this month that “China will always be our neighbour, we have no fight with them, let’s not get dragged into a fight that’s not our own.”

Anna Rosario Malindog-Uy, director of the pro-China Asian Century Philippines Strategic Studies Institute, wrote in the Manila Times on February 10 that “agreements such as the EDCA, the VFA and the Mutual Defence Treaty have not only cemented the US military presence and influence in the Philippines but also, most importantly, exemplified the Philippines’ dependence on the US in the military and defence sector.”

Teresita Ang See, former president of the Philippine Association for Chinese Studies and currently part of its advisory council, told This Week in Asia: “Filipinos in general condemn China’s action. But many also understand that China’s assertiveness is in response to US, Japanese and Australian provocations and increasing military presence in the Philippines.”

She warned that “we are fighting a proxy war between the US and China and in the end we will be the ants that get trampled upon”.

H/T: Johnsonwkchoi

Related:

Responding to the Catholic Bishops

Philippines counts the cost of tough South China Sea stance against Beijing

Philippines counts the cost of tough South China Sea stance against Beijing

Tina Marie (Ms. Cat)2 Comments

Philippines counts the cost of tough South China Sea stance against Beijing

The Philippines has become a laboratory in responding to Beijing on the South China Sea row, taking the most risk but showing inconsistency and underwhelming results thus far. Its predicament explains why other Southeast Asian claimant states remain unlikely to follow its lead. The tepid reaction to Manila’s pitch for an Asean claimants-only Code of Conduct is indicative.

As had happened in the past, lost economic opportunities and further erosion of Manila’s position in the flashpoint, relative to other disputants, may lead to a possible policy reversal in handling the maritime tiff come the 2028 presidential election.

…

Last year, the Philippines began to expose China’s illicit actions in the disputed waters. It inserted reporters in routine patrols and resupply sorties to document interference by the Chinese coastguard and maritime militia ships. The idea is to rally local and international support and impose reputational costs on Beijing. [Project Myoushu AKA Transparency Initiative]

This approach made strides in rousing public backing for Manila’s defence build-up, a stronger alliance with the United States, and a tougher stance against China. However, it also contributed to polarising domestic politics, affecting people-to-people ties and diminishing Chinese economic interest in the Philippines. Meanwhile, Beijing remains unmoved, weathering reputational costs and continuing to wield a capacity for escalation in the South China Sea.

…

During Xi’s visit to Hanoi last December, both sides vowed to upgrade the Kunming-Haiphong rail line. In contrast, Chinese funding for three rail projects discussed during the previous Duterte government is already dead in the water. China is unlikely to become a strong partner for President Ferdinand Marcos Jnr’s Build Better More infrastructure programme.

Losses in the tourism sector have also become evident. In 2019, before the pandemic, China was the Philippines’ fastest-growing tourist market, with more than 1.7 million arrivals, or a 21.1 per cent market share, just behind South Korea. Last year, as countries in Asia raced to benefit from the return of Chinese tourists, the Philippines only welcomed over 260,000 tourists from China, with the market share shrinking to just 4.84 per cent.

Ironically, for all the talk about Duterte’s China policy as appeasement, it was under his watch that the Philippines made the biggest upgrade in infrastructure in the Spratlys since the 1970s. He also invested in modernising the country’s military, procuring modern frigates from South Korea, multirole response vessels from Japan and cruise missiles from India. All these happened while relations with China remained stable.

Another irony is that while Manila celebrates every resupply mission to the Second Thomas Shoal that successfully eluded the Chinese blockade, Vietnam is busy doing substantial reclamation on its Spratly outposts and gearing for a potential second airfield, with reportedly little interference from Beijing. [Bueller?]

These should offer plenty of insights as the strategy of the Philippines over the maritime squabble evolves.