Understanding and Countering China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations | RAND

As noted, there appear to be real challenges working through the necessary technologies to support command messaging efforts from being able to acquire simple programs, such as Adobe [1], that can help improve image quality of released content to access to social media. It would seem prudent that an assessment of such issues should be conducted by the command with necessary remediation actions undertaken when the new commander comes into USINDOPACOM.

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The Global Engagement Center (GEC) at the U.S. Department of State [2], for example, partially funds the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative [Center for Strategic and International Studies]. The GEC, the State Department, or DoD should seek to identify other voices that can support and that can more credibly communicate key messages.

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However, efforts that can support other organizations and institutions and even individual influencers getting the message out via their social media channels (which would often include TikTok) could generate significant social media traffic on the gray zone issue. Powell’s social media channels are full of content highlighting the most recent gray zone aggressions by China. Todd Helmus of RAND, for example, has highlighted how the U.S. military should more closely work with and support online influencers. The same article highlights how the U.S. military could actuate its own military personnel to use social media [3] to serve as eyewitnesses to critical national security issues. At a minimum, however, the United States should work to directly support key civil society organizations [4], especially those with an active presence on social media.

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The United States should make an assertive effort to train and, as necessary, equip partners and allies to actively highlight the PRC’s gray zone behaviors. Given the leadership role that the Philippines is playing in this space, efforts should also find ways to empower the PCG to share insights and lessons learned with other Southeast Asia partners.

Notes:

[1] Adobe:

Adobe Photoshop:

Photoshop is an image creation, graphic design and photo editing software developed by Adobe. 

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Photoshop has been the industry standard image manipulation program for so long that its name has become a verb. It is common parlance to say that an image has been “photoshopped,” or even just “shopped,” meaning that it’s been edited or manipulated.

Adobe just teased AI-generative video software — and it’s scary good:

But, in the hands of a more nefarious user, the technology will likely further the ease with which deep fakes [5], political propaganda, and misleading ads can be created. The realism demonstrated in the examples suggests Firefly could generate videos that are difficult to distinguish from the real thing.

[2] Global Engagement Center:

Global Engagement Center Fighting Russian Propaganda with American Propaganda (archived)

US Officials Won’t Say if a New Anti–Russia Propaganda Project Is Targeting Americans

Obama Quietly Signs The ‘Countering Disinformation And Propaganda Act’ Into Law (NDAA 2017-Established the Global Engagement Center)

Obama’s Propaganda Gift to Trump (archived)

[3] The military’s use of social media for PsyOps:

A Real-Life Psyop: How the U.S. Military Spread Anti-Vax Conspiracy Theories

A 2023 strategy document by the U.S. military, for example, calls on U.S. forces to “weaponize information to manipulate an adversary’s perception of reality by influencing and disrupting social systems and technical connections that are foundational to a modern society. Disinformation, misinformation, and propaganda can trigger a chain of events in an adversary’s society that gradually degrades its domestic unity, undermines societal trust in its government and institutions, and diminishes its international stature.”

Such chaos is an opportunity “to prevent [enemies] from opposing U.S. actions, or to better position U.S. joint forces in the event of armed conflict,” the document states.

Pentagon opens sweeping review of clandestine psychological operations

Psychological operations to promote U.S. narratives overseas are nothing new in the military, but the popularity of western social media across the globe has led to an expansion of tactics, including the use of artificial personas and images — sometimes called “deep fakes.” [5] The logic is that views expressed by what appears to be, say, an Afghan woman or an Iranian student might be more persuasive than if they were openly pushed by the U.S. government.

U.S. military, on Tinder, says to swipe left on Iran-backed militants

Twitter secretly boosted US psyops in Middle East, report says

The State Department’s Twitter War With ISIS Is Embarrassing

The US government got caught using sock puppets to spread propaganda on social media

The 2012 NDAA Legalized The Use Of Propaganda On The US Public – 5GW: 2012 NDAA – Propaganda – MISO – InfoOps – PsyOps

[4] Civil Society, Civil Society Organizations = astroturfed CIA/NED/USAID/Corporate front organizations.

[5] Deepfakes:

A growing problem of ‘deepfake geography’: How AI falsifies satellite images(Archived)

Previously:

The marriage of RAND and SeaLight

Part 3a: RAND and SeaLight – Taiwan Relations Act

RAND and SeaLight Part 3b: Four Ways China Is Growing Its Media Influence in Southeast Asia

RAND and SeaLight document (work in progress)