Part Three: Sternenko and the Promoters of Judicial Reform in Ukraine (Tercera parte: Sternenko y los promotores de la reforma judicial en Ucrania)

DEJURE against Portnov 

Honor is not the only active force converging in the mobilization in favor of Serhii Sternenko, Beria, in his actions against the Ukrainian justice system. A number of non-governmental organizations, with both nationalist and liberal leanings (in the sense commonly used in Ukraine, of commitment to the European Union’s Euro-Atlantic strategy), are also participating in the protests. These groups accused President Zelensky at the time of protecting “pro-Russian forces disguised in Ukraine seeking revenge.” 

In this mobilization of civil society, especially after the guilty verdict of February 23, 2021, the role of activists in favor of judicial reform in Ukraine stands out. A significant example of this militant, Ukrainian nationalist, and pro-European liberal commitment is the role played by some of the individuals who are or were responsible for the executive management of the DEJURE Foundation, such as Maryna Khromykh and Mykhailo Zhernakov. 

The commitment to judicial reform 

The DEJURE Foundation (Democracy, Justice, Reform) was established in 2016 with the aim of promoting reform of the Ukrainian justice system to ensure it operates in accordance with the principles of the rule of law. DEJURE’s current executive director, Mykhailo Zhernakov, was one of the three legal experts who spearheaded the organization’s creation. 

In a joint article from June 2025, co-authored with fellow DEJURE member Kateryna Shevchuk and recently published in European Pravda, Zhernakov traced the origins of the justice crisis in Ukraine to the period of 2020-2021. Presented as a “genuine constitutional catastrophe,” the article referred to the attempt by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine to declare the electronic asset declarations of politicians and officials unconstitutional following a motion filed with the Court by 48 members of parliament, whom these legal scholars described as “remnants of the pro-Russian system of the Yanukovych era, representatives of the Opposition Platform for Life [Medvedchuk], and individuals linked to the oligarch Igor Kolomoisky.” According to Zhernakov and Shevchuk, the Court did not stop there and also attempted to reverse the language and agrarian reforms. The response came in the form of protests from groups like DEJURE, criticism from the Venice Commission of the Constitutional Court, accusing it of usurping the role of Parliament, or Zelensky’s threat to suspend the Court through (an unequivocally illegal) presidential decree. 

The proposed solution was a judicial reform, inspired by European Union proposals, which today is once again raising fundamental conflicts between pro-European forces, claimed to represent figures like Zhernakov, and the Zelensky establishment. A striking element of this solution is the role it seeks to assign to international experts in the selection of members of the Constitutional Court and other bodies within the judicial system. Another crucial aspect is the parallel reform of the Supreme Court, which activists like Zhernakov link to pro-Russian positions, opposition to reforms, or, cryptically, to “a judicial system reminiscent of the Yanukovych era.”  

Zhernakov’s role in the recent conflict between the Zelensky administration and the EU-backed anti-corruption bodies is also relevant. In statements reported by argumentua.com, Zhernakov also addressed this issue in July 2025. 

Regarding the Sternenko case, the determining factor is the convergence of DEJURE’s interests to use, especially in 2021, the legal proceedings against the Odessa activist to advance its strategy of imposing the so-called judicial reform on the Zelensky administration in Ukraine. 

DEJURE and Sternenko’s legal trials 

The organization DEJURE actively participates in the campaign on behalf of Beria in his legal battles before Ukrainian courts, and its representatives, especially Maryna Khromykh and Mykhailo Zhernakov, are among the leading figures in the political and legal literature critical of the Ukrainian judges’ actions against Sternenko. They represent the type of activists who, during this period, viewed the legal proceedings against him as politically motivated and linked the legal troubles of the former leader of Praviy Sektor in Odessa to “the resurgence of the worst aspects of Viktor Yanukovych’s presidency in the Ukrainian justice system.” 

Strikingly, Maryna Khromykh emerges throughout this period as a key figure in the world of civic organizations committed to Sternenko. A representative in the initial phase of the conflict for the Ukrainian branch of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights [Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union] (UHHRU), Khromykh, then the group’s Advocacy and Communications manager, assumed a prominent role in supporting Sternenko. In fact, it was the Ukrainian Helsinki Union for Human Rights (comprising more than thirty Ukrainian NGOs) that would come to represent Sternenko’s interests in relation to the legal proceedings linked to the three serious attacks he allegedly suffered in 2018. The group’s and Khromykh’s position was that these three potentially fatal attacks against the civic activist had never been properly investigated. 

In its commentary on the Sternenko verdict in the Sherbych case, the UHHRU argued that irregularities had been ignored by Judge Poprevych, who presided over the case. These included the court’s acceptance of a witness’s testimony, even though the witness had never been questioned, and the fact that the initial search of Sternenko was conducted without a lawyer present and without Beria even being allowed to contact him. The UHHRU also deemed the Kuznetsov case “questionable,” given that it was being handled by a judge who had received highly unfavorable assessments from groups advocating for judicial reform. This organization, along with other civic activists, went so far as to argue that the trial of Sternenko for Kuznetsov’s death was politically motivated. 

In complete consistency with her legal and political positions, Maryna Khromykh joined DEJURE as executive director in November 2021, at the height of the Sternenko case, and held that position until September 2024. Demonstrating the significance of her commitment to Beria, the presentation by the Montaigne Institute, with its distinctly liberal political orientation, states that Jromyj has “worked in the field of human rights, coordinating the initiative ‘Who is behind the murder of Kateryna Handziuk?’, as well as managing political advocacy and communications at the Ukrainian Helsinki Union for Human Rights. She also actively participated in the campaign for justice in the Serhii Sternenko case between 2018 and 2021.”  

Support for Sternenko is not limited to media and legal defense, but extends to activism in the streets. In this regard, Khromykh co-organizes hard-hitting actions such as those on February 27 and March 20 in Bankova, in front of Zelensky’s presidential building. According to the BBC, Khromykh states that the president’s decisions are being influenced by Avakov, who is imposing the narrative that Poroshenko is behind the actions in support of Sternenko, appealing for a change of attitude: “The current government, like the previous one, has every opportunity to reform both the police and judicial systems. It’s up to them: either they will go down in history as losers who squandered all these opportunities, or they will do something useful and be remembered as reformers. ” Khromykh’s commitment to street action will then lead him to accompany Sternenko and [Serhii] Filimonov in November 2021 at the presentation of the main papers of the Academy of Street Protest. 

Zhernakov’s commitment to Sternenko is equally relevant. In the article on the Sternenko verdict from February 2021, for example, KHPG refers to DEJURE’s attack on Judge Poprevych, citing two recent rulings that, despite not having a “direct connection” to the Sherbych case, have “exacerbated the concerns of many observers regarding this belated trial and the extremely long sentence.” In another document, DEJURE is more explicit in its assessment of Poprevych, noting that he is “known for his lack of integrity.” 

In other statements to Deutsche Welle, Zhernakov further developed the heroic image of Sternenko, presenting him as a symbol of the modern Ukraine that pro-Russian forces want to eliminate. “He is a young Ukrainian-speaking man from Odessa, a patriot who not only avoided being assassinated but also skillfully fought off assassination attempts, and who is successfully fighting the aggressor on other important fronts. For our enemy, the existence of such people is simply deadly dangerous. And if we cannot kill him, we should at least imprison him,” Zhernakov stated at the time. 

In the relationship between Sternenko and Dejure, it is relevant to note that their convergence in mobilizing for judicial reform extends far beyond Beria ‘s period of legal difficulties between 2018 and 2021. One of the most striking joint actions in the collaboration between Sternenko and Zhernakov was the political liquidation of the Kyiv District Administrative Court (OASK), then presided over by Pavlo Vovk, considered a close associate of Portnov. According to Channel 5, “In 2020, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) reported suspicions about the court’s president, Pavlo Vovk, and six other judges of the Supreme Court of Ukraine. According to NABU, they formed a criminal group to seize state power. As evidence, they released recordings of conversations from Pavlo Vovk’s office, the so-called ‘Vovk tapes’. ” 

Key figures in the campaign against the OASK, both Zhernakov and Sternenko, celebrated the de facto political decision of December 13, 2022, to dissolve the Tribunal. In his Telegram message, before the crucial vote in the Rada—in which it was essential to ensure that no member expressed opposition, which would have effectively vetoed the proposal to dissolve the Tribunal—Sternenko reminded everyone that “this is the same OASK that would supposedly ‘appoint’ Yanukovych as president if Russian troops were to take Kyiv. So the deputies now have a very simple choice: either they vote for Ukraine or they vote for the Russian agents. And no one who wants to save the OASK will get away with it so easily.” This ultimatum, orchestrated behind the scenes in the Rada, was directed at pro-Medvedchuk and pro-Shariy deputies. 

The bonds of DEJURE 

In her farewell address as Executive Director of DEJURE in September 2024, Khromykh noted, referring to judicial reform, that “we succeeded in making it part of the conditions for European integration, as well as modernizing key judicial institutions and launching a transparent competition for the Constitutional Court, and much, much more,” an achievement that links both the DEJURE team and its activist partners at the Anti-Corruption Center (Vitaliy Shabunin) and Automaidan (Katerina Butko). In its actions, DEJURE frequently collaborates with other NGOs such as Automaidan and Shabunin’s Anti-Corruption Center. 

The support of DEJURE, and other similar non-governmental organizations, for Sternenko aligns with the European liberal world’s view of his legal troubles. For example, a report by Andrew Wilson for the European Council on Foreign Relations presents the Sternenko case as an attack by so-called revanchist forces (“Russian and local media labeled him a radical nationalist,” Wilson notes) against the reform movement in Ukraine. According to this view, imported from Ukrainian liberal nationalism, the resulting crisis “deprived Zelensky of the opportunity to present a positive vision of the ongoing reforms: the Sternenko case meant that he could no longer credibly claim that progress was being made in some sectors of Ukraine.” This view even translated into the very explicit thesis of the UK ambassador, Melinda Simmons, that the Serhii Sternenko case demonstrated the need for judicial reform in Ukraine.  

DEJURE’s connection to the pro-European liberal movement is difficult to conceal. In fact, Zhernakov is emerging as one of the key figures in the de facto alliance that links European Union institutions with Soros’s International Renaissance Foundation (IRF) in Ukraine and Ukrainian NGOs on the ground. He is, in this sense, a contributor to one of the main outlets of this alliance, European Pravda, and DEJURE includes the IRF among its collaborating entities. These are the forces that consider themselves representatives of a Ukraine that is “fighting for its identity and European belonging ” against “not only external enemies, but also internal saboteurs.” 

DEJURE’s financial structure unequivocally reflects these connections. According to data provided by zib.com.ua, based on the 2023 fiscal year, DEJURE received approximately 48 million hryvnias (UAH) from foreign organizations (for both operating expenses and specific projects). 43.8% of this funding came from the German government, 22.3% from the EU representation in Ukraine, 17.3% from USAID and the National Endowment for Democracy, and 12.7% from the International Renaissance Foundation. This funding model clearly linked DEJURE to the bloc close to the US Democratic Party and to the political structures of Germany. 

The Dejure-Sternenko alliance against the structures inherited from the Yanukovych period: the conflict with Andriy Portnov

A very relevant aspect of the fight of DEJURE and the Honor-Sternenko street fighting bloc is the opposition to a specific figure in the history of the formation of the judicial system in Ukraine: Andriy Portnov, former deputy director of the presidential administration during the Yanukovych administration. 

Andrew Wilson’s aforementioned report argues that Oleksiy Honcharuk, the prime minister initially appointed by Zelensky, led a hybrid government between August 2019 and March 2020 in which revanchist forces with an oligarchic base—openly hostile to reforms and aligned with Russia—coexisted with reformist forces. In the subsequent Denys Shmyhal phase, these revanchist forces were strengthened, according to Wilson, by the rise of the growing media empire of the pro-Russian oligarch Medvedchuk, the core of an entire media ecosystem that included websites attacking reformist forces, such as the strana.ua group, the blogger Anatoly Shariy and his political party, and former figures from the Yanukovych era. Any resemblance to reality is purely coincidental.  

In the reformist European and Ukrainian nationalist vision, the Sternenko case thus became a symbol of the struggle for justice and the defense of European values against the pro-Russian “fifth column.” During this period, Zhernakov went so far as to describe the actions against Sternenko as a “special operation by the enemy,” highlighting the propaganda efforts by the three pro-Russian channels associated with Viktor Medvedchuk to portray Sternenko as a murderer. This view was extended at the time to members of Zelensky’s party. “The indictment of Sternenko for murder is a step toward restoring order in the country,” stated, for example, Oleksandr Dubinsky, one of the leaders of Servant of the People.  

However, even more than Shariy or Medvedchuk, it is Andriy Portnov who most clearly represents, for liberal nationalist forces, the much-criticized fifth column. Exiled in Russia and Austria since 2014, after his return to Ukraine in May 2019, Portnov and his allies are seen as the leading figures among those who view Sternenko’s indictments as an opportunity to punish the Euromaidan “radicals” and restore the old order in what appears to be becoming a symbolic battleground between pro-European and pro-Russian forces in Ukraine. In the Sternenko case, his role was indeed decisive, as Pavel Rudyakov noted in 2020 on ukraina.ru:  “Andrey Portnov and his team undoubtedly played a special role. He ensured consistency in handling the Sternenko case, preventing interested parties from delaying it. He harshly criticized the authorities, calling their representatives ‘shameful imbeciles’ for their inaction in the Odessa murder investigation. He exposed the complicity of the SBU and the Prosecutor General’s Office in covering up high-profile murders and collaborating with radical groups. Portnov has repeatedly demonstrated the effectiveness of his legal work in curbing the illegality of radicals and protecting their victims in recent months. The selection of a preventive measure for Sternenko is yet another success.” 

But Portnov was more than that. As noted in an August 2020 article on euromaidanpress.com, which identifies him as close to Dubinsky and legal advisor to the Kolomoyskyi group, the media often portrays him as the “gray cardinal” of the judiciary. In reality, he is a kind of “corruption manager” who controls loyal courts . For Zhernakov, Portnov thus embodies all the problems Ukraine faces in reforming its justice system. In April 2021, Zhernakov, who had also held positions in the judiciary during the Yanukovych era, noted in an article for zn.ua that the situation had worsened with “the return to Ukraine of Andriy Portnov, the infamous supervisor of the judicial system during the Yanukovych era… By an incredible coincidence, the ‘public order’ and ‘law enforcement’ departments of President Zelensky’s office were headed by Andriy Smyrnov and Oleh Tatarov, former lawyers for high-ranking officials during the Yanukovych era, including Portnov himself. They ‘advise’ the president, proposing various solutions in the areas under their control.” In his article, he presents Portnov, along with Pavel Vovk, as one of the main controllers of judges in Ukraine and a major obstacle to judicial reform. 

In any case, Portnov undoubtedly stands out for becoming, upon his return to Ukraine, not only a staunch critic of Poroshenko in his final years as president, but also one of the main instigators of public opposition to Serhii Sternenko, accusing him of murder and other crimes. Portnov’s legal team also represents the victim’s widow, Ivan Kuznetsov, who vows to secure a life sentence for Sternenko. Portnov announced his active involvement in the Kuznetsov case against Beria, “the Odessa criminal supported by Yuriy Lutsenko,” Poroshenko’s Prosecutor General, on April 20, 2019, promising to thoroughly investigate “all prosecutors and investigators who covered up this murder.” 

For his opponents, as a BBC article in 2020 points out, he is the most fervent defender of those who claim to be “all the itinerant criminal scum, scoundrels, radicals, delinquents, activists and thieves of foreign funds” led by former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko; In short, those who consider themselves the victorious side of the Euromaidan.” For the opponents of the nationalism that triumphed in 2014, “whom Portnov exceptionally personifies, Sternenko is more than just a ‘presumptuous nationalist’ who ‘cynically hunted down and killed’ a man, leaving three children orphaned.” For them, the guilty verdict against Sternenko, an active participant in the events in Odesa in May 2014, also represents a unique opportunity to punish those responsible for the Maidan protests and, in their view, restore the justice violated in 2014.”  

In this way, the BBC summarizes the thesis of the existence of these revanchist forces, a thesis championed by pro-Maidan Ukrainian nationalism during that period. Following the February 2021 conviction, the same network took the opportunity to quote Portnov’s remarks: “This sentence represents not only a verdict against this criminal, but also against the order that has prevailed in the country for the past seven years.” 

Following the verdict in the Sherbych case, Portnov wrote on his Telegram channel  on February 23, 2021, that “Sternenko, a former member of Praviy Sektor, a radical and nationalist, was found guilty, sentenced, and remanded in custody. Some of his assets were confiscated. This verdict not only affects this criminal but all those shameless radicals who have been parasitizing the country and the established order for the past seven years. The verdict was delivered despite the total resistance of the propaganda media, foreign-funded organizations, politicians and officials from the Maidan parties, and other scum. This is the first of three upcoming verdicts. We expect the proceedings for two more indictments—premeditated murder and drug trafficking—to conclude soon.” 

For pro-European liberal nationalism favoring judicial reform, Portnov was the true enemy. Thus, in October 2021, Zhernakov accused Portnov of having built Ukraine’s current corrupt judicial system when, in addition to being deputy head of the Yanukovych administration, he was head of the Main Directorate for Judicial and Judicial System Reform. Despite being unable to practice law as a result of the post-2014 purges, he believes—or rather, asserts—that a significant portion of the country’s judiciary owes their careers or positions to him. 

Referring to the murder of Demyan Hanul, and mentioning the case of Kateryna Handziuk and the attempts against Sternenko, in March 2025 Zhernakov maintained that “as long as the security forces and the courts serve Portnov’s cronies, the bandits, and simply anyone who gives them more money and acts effectively only on political orders, Ukraine will lose its best sons and daughters. And with them, the possibility of existing. We must guarantee the integrity, viability, and independence of the security forces and the courts. Otherwise, we will die. Because the Russian Federation and its sympathetic bandits will undoubtedly try to continue doing so. And yes, finally, let us grant citizens the right to protection.” 

Portnov was killed in Pozuelo de Alarcón on May 21, 2025. According to sources cited by eadaily  and  Ukraina.ru, Portnov had announced before his death “his intention to collect data on Ukrainian nationalist political and social activists.” The goal was to identify and publicly expose them, and, in the future, use the data obtained for possible criminal prosecution. In a Telegram post that same day, Sternenko addressed him, saying: “My sources confirm the liquidation of the traitor to Ukraine, Portnov. And this is, once again, a reason to feed the Russification movement!”  [contribute money to Sternenko to send equipment to the army and effectively carry out this liquidation work]. 

Speaking to Focus.ua that day, Zhernakov argued that the assassinated politician was an openly pro-Russian figure with close ties to Moscow who wielded enormous influence over the judicial system, resisted reforms, and was, in fact, one of the architects of the corrupt judicial structure that, in his view, he himself continued to maintain in Ukraine. He asserted that, for this reason, “Portnov’s assassination does not automatically solve the problem ”; “we must not deceive ourselves: his disappearance does not mean that the system will be cleaned up immediately. We still need to continue judicial reform; purge the judicial system of corrupt judges; reform the security forces; and prevent Portnov from being replaced by other officials like him. But, in fact, this is already happening: today in Ukraine, there are other people who continue to manage the system created by Portnov.” 

Fortunately for Ukraine, it must be said that Zhernakov and his allied activists are there to fight against all this structural corruption. But there are some paradoxes, for example, that he too attained the position of judge during the Yanukovych period, with actions during that time that some critics consider typical of judges with pro-Russian leanings. And, contrary to its claims of modernizing the justice system, DEJURE has also been repeatedly accused of interfering in the judicial system, and not only from circles suspected of being close to the pro-Russian world. It should be remembered in this regard that, in early 2022, the DEJURE Foundation went so far as to block the work of the Supreme Council of Justice. 

According to critical media outlets, the substantial sum of external funding received by the foundation enabled DEJURE to form a majority on the Public Integrity Council and establish control over the Higher Commission for the Qualification of Judges and the Higher Council of Justice. This control allowed them to resolve their own issues, administer selective justice, eliminate opponents, and exert pressure on the authorities. Thus, an institution called the “Public Integrity Council” was created with foreign funding, its objective being to influence the entire Ukrainian judicial system. 

Some critical sources, far removed from the pro-Russian sphere, point out that the absurdity of the situation also lies in the fact that institutions formed by public organizations and linked to the Ukrainian judicial system, such as the Public Integrity Council, are cynically criticized by these same NGOs, who claim that they constitute a means to do the very thing they criticize: impose their own cronies. Thus, the Public Integrity Council, which Mykhailo Zhernakov has essentially appropriated, is responsible for integrity in Ukraine. The fight against corruption can then be equated with imposing the power agenda of organizations like DEJURE on the Ukrainian judicial system. 

The critical action against Portnov could not, of course, go unnoticed by the street protest forces. In the spring of 2019, members of Honor visited the “fugitive,” accused of actively speaking against Ukraine and disseminating  pro-Russian propaganda messages. They unfurled a banner in front of his house that read: “Portnov, come back to Ukraine. We are waiting for you,” as well as “millions of Ukrainians who were harmed by the actions of Yanukovych and his team.”